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Abstract
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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4693
The Government of China has placed strong emphasis on 
addressing problems related to agriculture, farmers, and 
rural society, with the development of a “new socialist 
countryside” designated as a top priority for the Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). The financing of public 
services in rural areas will be a key determinant of the 
Plan’s success. This report analyzes the performance of the 
intergovernmental fiscal system—the financing of rural 
development through counties, townships, and villages 
—and the impact of recent reforms. The authors show 
that achieving the government’s objectives will require 
channeling substantial new resources to rural areas.  In 
addition, ensuring the effective transfer of resources and 
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public finance and public service delivery in China. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at afock@worldbank.org and christine.wong@sbs.ox.ac.uk. 
their efficient utilization will require fundamental reforms 
to a wide range of public institutions, including budget 
and planning processes, personnel management systems, 
and the organization of government agencies.
   The authors argue that a comprehensive reform strategy 
is needed to address fundamental vertical and horizontal 
imbalances in the intergovernmental fiscal system The 
reforms must reach beyond the fiscal system to build 
improved accountability mechanisms to improve public 
service delivery at the grassroots level. And, given China’s 
size and diversity, reform efforts must focus on improving 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past few years, the Chinese government has increased its focus on rural 
development.  Premier Wen Jiabao has repeatedly called for attention to the “sannong 
wenti”, i.e., problems related to agriculture, farmers, and rural society.
1  In line with this 
new focus, the government has significantly increased resources allocated to the rural sector, 
and introduced many new programs.    Beginning with the Rural Tax and Fee Reform in 2002, 
the government has also implemented a number of reforms aimed at improving the fiscal 
health of rural governments and alleviating farmers’ burdens. 
The government has announced the long-term goal of building a xiaokang (well-off) and 
harmonious society.
2  The 16
th Party Congress defined the objective of a xiaokang society – 
to be reached by 2020 – to include social, environmental, equality, and many other objectives 
-- in addition to income and economic growth.
3  As stated by Premier Wen Jiabao, these 
long-term goals involve “putting people first,” and promoting reform and innovation in 
accordance with the “five balances” ⎯ balancing urban and rural development, balancing 
development among regions, balancing economic and social development, balancing man and 
nature, and balancing domestic development and opening wider to the outside world.
4 
Under this strategy, the building of a “new socialist countryside” (NSC) is designated as 
a top priority for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010). In his speech to the 
National People’s Congress in March 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao referred to the project as a 
                                                             
1 The key policy objectives related to the sannong wenti include increasing agricultural productivity and 
maintaining food security, raising farmers’ incomes, reducing poverty, and improving environmental 
sustainability. 
2  The term xiaokang society refers to a well-off society in which all people can lead a fairly comfortable life. The 
term was first used by Deng Xiaoping when reform and opening up were launched in the late 1970s. Deng defined 
xiaokang with reference to a target per capita GDP of US$800 by 2000. Because of China’s rapid economic 
growth, a xiaokang society as defined by Deng was roughly achieved by the end of the last century. 
3 Areas of a xiaokang society set by the Party include, in addition to the GDP per capita growth target (US$3,000 
by 2020), improving democracy; advancing science and education; enriching culture; fostering social harmony; 
and upgrading the texture of the life of the people. See Jiang Zemin, Report at 16
th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, November 17, 2002.  See website: http://service.china.org.cn. Many attempts have 
been made to further specify a xiaokang society, and develop indicators and targets for its monitoring. See, for 
example, China Statistics Press (1999, Appendix 1); UN Country Team in China (2004); Li and Zhu (2003). 
4 Wen (2004). 
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“major historic task”
5    The target and requirements of building new socialist villages can be 
summarized as developing production, raising living standards, (creating) a cultured rural 
environment, (ensuring) tidy and clean villages, and (instituting) democratic management.
6 
This renewed emphasis on rural development is long overdue.    The urban-rural income 
gap has grown over the past two decades and per capita urban incomes now stand at more 
than three times rural incomes, a ratio that is among the largest in the world.  Moreover, 
under China’s decentralized fiscal system, the provision of public services has also grown 
increasingly biased in favor of urban, prosperous areas, and the rural areas are disadvantaged.   
Rural areas were also disadvantaged in the past, when, under the commune system, resources 
were extracted from agriculture to pay for industrialization.  The rural sector was asked to 
be self-sufficient in the provision of basic services such as infrastructure, health and 
education. When budgetary revenues were centralized in 1994, the situation worsened for 
rural, grassroots governments. Since the mid-1990s, even as China grew richer and 
government revenues improved rapidly the rural sector remained largely self-financed.    The 
result was that in many localities, rural governments were unable to finance mandated 
services in basic education, public health, water, sanitation, etc.  Estimates of the Human 
Development Index at 0.81 in the urban sector and 0.67 in the rural sector (UNDP 2005) are 
undoubtedly a reflection of the poorer public services enjoyed by rural citizens.     
  The true extent to which rural services have lagged behind the growing needs of the rural 
populace is difficult to ascertain.  The current statistical reporting system provides very 
limited information on service delivery at subnational levels.  When such information is 
available, it is not disaggregated between the rural and urban sectors.  Estimates are 
increasingly difficult to make from regional totals because of the commingling of urban units 
in what used to be more purely rural categories of counties and townships.    The extent of the 
                                                             
5 Wen (2006).  Earlier, Premier Wen had already stated that “Solving the sannong wenti remain the top priority 
work (zhongzhong zhizhong) for the whole Party” and he stressed the guiding principle of “industry feeding 
(fanpu) agriculture,” and cities supporting rural villages. Wen Jiabao’s Explanations on the CCP Suggestions on 
the Eleventh Five Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development (October 8, 2005). See Xinhua News 
Agency, October 19, 2005. 
6 In Chinese this is summed up in twenty characters:  生产发展，生活宽裕，乡风文明，村容整洁，管理民
主。A good summary of the history and policy trends and priorities for building a “new socialist countryside” are 
provided by Minister of Finance Jin Renqing (2006). 
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inadequacy of rural services in the poor regions can only be glimpsed through anecdotal 
reports and field visits, which are necessarily limited in scope and coverage.  In the course 
of this study, for example, we visited unheated, un-lit schools in Henan and Yunnan 
provinces, in localities where winter temperatures often dip below freezing.  We also saw 
many health clinics and hospitals in deplorable condition, with little capacity for providing 
health care.  Most remarkably, because of the pervasive reliance on user charges, even in 
one of China’s most poverty stricken localities we visited, none of the most basic public 
services were provided free of charge, not even police protection.
7 By the end of the 1990s, it 
had become increasingly clear that inadequate local public finance was impeding the 
implementation of key parts of the government’s development agenda, such as providing 
universal basic education and public health (World Bank 2002).    The renewed rural focus is 
the government’s response to these problems. 
This report analyzes the treatment of rural local governments under China’s fiscal system 
and the impact of recent reforms.    By examining the intergovernmental fiscal arrangements, 
we will show that implementing the NSC program will require substantial new resources to 
be channeled to the rural sector.    In addition, to ensure the effective transfer of resources and 
their efficient utilization will require some fundamental reforms to a wide range of 
institutions. 
This report is organized as follows:  after this introduction, Section 2 examines the 
intergovernmental fiscal system and recent trends in rural public finance.    Section 3 looks at 
the organization of rural governments and their finances, drilling down to details on the 
ground.  Section 4 turns to the institutional and organizational structure governing rural 
development to identify some impediments to progress.  Section 5 analyzes recent reforms 
and assesses how far they have come to addressing the problems.  Section 6 offers brief 
concluding comments. 
2.  The Intergovernmental Fiscal System and Rural Public Finance 
We begin with an examination of the current intergovernmental fiscal system (IFS) – the 
                                                             
7 Field visit in February 2004. 
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assignment of expenditures, revenues, transfers, and subnational borrowing. This IFS 
determines local government responsibilities and the resources they can mobilize; how the 
system is designed and how well its components work together and have an impact on 
shaping outcomes. 
All countries in the world assign some functions to local governments based on the belief 
that some services are better delivered by local governments, which are more familiar with 
local needs and conditions.  The subsidiarity principle calls for the provision of services to 
be devolved to the lowest-level jurisdiction that corresponds to the benefit area (Oates 1972; 
Tiebout 1956). In general, it is believed that assigning more responsibilities to local 
governments can be useful for achieving a more efficient allocation of resources and 
stimulating economic growth, and the worldwide trend is the direction of decentralization 
(see, for example, World Bank 2005b).  However, decentralization may weaken the 
government’s capacity to ensure an equitable provision of services to citizens in different 
jurisdictions, or to maintain macroeconomic stability (Bahl and Martinez-Vasquez 2006).  
In countries where administrative capacities are limited and concentrated at the center, 
devolution of responsibilities may lead to greater inefficiencies and deterioration of services 
(Prud’homme 1995). 
Therefore, economic theory offers no one-size-fits-all template for deciding which level 
of government should be responsible for the provision of particular services. Because of the 
existing trade-offs, countries choose different degrees of fiscal decentralization in accordance 
with their objectives and priorities, as well as their historical circumstances, and any given 
assignment can only be judged against the objectives set by the central government in its 
decentralization strategy. Moreover, at any given degree of decentralization, countries have 
also chosen somewhat different configurations for their IFS, with some countries assigning 
more own source revenues to local governments while others relying more on the use of 
intergovernmental transfers. 
The provision of public services in rural areas is a challenge in all countries around the 
world due to three features that are common to rural local governments: weak tax bases, high 
costs of providing services, and weak administrative capacities for managing resources and 
services. These are especially marked in remote communities where service provision is 
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costly due to factors such as geographic conditions or low population density, and where 
local governments do not have a sufficient tax base to be economically viable. For instance, 
class sizes may be smaller in schools, public facilities may be used at lower capacities, and a 
premium may have to be paid to attract qualified teachers, doctors, and administrative staff to 
work in remote rural areas.
8 Most remote communities do not offer a great many services. In 
industrialized countries in the OECD, rural local governments draw on a mix of local taxes, 
user charges, and transfers to meet national standards for minimum service provision – for 
basic education, health care, sanitation, and infrastructural services.  Given their lower 
revenue capacities and higher expenditure needs, these governments are relatively more 
dependent on transfers than their urban counterparts. 
  In China the problems of financing rural governments are not confined to those in remote 
locations, however, but apply more generally. While high costs and weak administrative 
capacities are also present in localities in remote regions, virtually all rural counties and 
township governments (and villages) face large fiscal gaps that are rooted in China’s highly 
decentralized system of finance and the collapse of redistribution during the long fiscal 
decline of 1980-1996 (discussed later in this section). 
2.1.  The Structure of Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements  
China is among the most decentralized countries in the world.  Subnational governments at 
the provincial, municipal, county, and township levels account for more than 70 percent of 
national budgetary expenditures, and this share has grown in recent years (Table 1).  Since 
the late 1980s, these expenditure shares have corresponded largely to financing 
responsibilities (World Bank 2002, 2008, Wong 2007).  Two other features are salient for 
China’s rural public finance. 
First, while in most countries decentralization is to the second, intermediate tier of 
government, in China it reaches all the way down to the lowest levels, with significant 
expenditure shares (and thus de facto responsibilities for service delivery) distributed among 
                                                             
8 In Canada, municipal spending on all services is considerably higher in remote areas than in the rest of the 
country – 41 percent higher than in the country on average in the Yukon; 173 percent higher in the Northwest 
Territories; and 171 percent higher in Nunavut (Kitchen and Slack, year?). In China there is a similar 
arrangement to provide hardship and remote area subsidies for public employees in remote areas. 
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each of the five levels of government (Table 1).   
Table 1.  Division of Budgetary Expenditures by Administrative Level 
2005 2004  2003 
 
Total 
of which, for 
Education 
Total 
of which, for 
Education 
Total 
of which, for 
Education 
Central 25.9% 6% 27.7% 7% 30.1% 8% 
Provinces 18.9%  16%  18.7%  15%  18.7%  15% 
Pref. / Cities  22.7%  18%  22.2%  18%  21.5%  18% 
Counties 26.7%  48%  25.2%  46%  23.3%  42% 
Townships 5.9%  12%  6.1%  14%  6.3%  17% 
Source: Calculated from Compendium of Local Fiscal Statistics, 2003, 2004, 2005; and 
Finance Yearbook of China, 2004, 2005, 2006. 
Sitting at the bottom of this structure, rural local governments at the county and township 
levels in China jointly account for nearly one-third of national budgetary expenditures.  
They have almost sole responsibility for the provision of vital public services to the rural 
populace. For example, as shown in Table 1, the high costs of providing basic education 
explain why the county and township levels account for 60 percent of total budgetary outlays 
for education.  Below the township is still another layer of administration, albeit not a 
formal level of government.  These are administrative villages, which are the basic level of 
governance for public affairs for most rural citizens; they have taken over many of the 
functions formerly performed by the people’s communes.   
The administrative village has important functions in implementing government policies 
and in the provision of public goods and service. These include the enforcement of 
government policies in such important areas as land administration and family planning, and, 
in the area of public finance, the collection of fees and other revenues and the financing and 
provision of public goods and services. In particular, villages play an important role in the 
provision of rural infrastructural services and are involved in poverty reduction activities, 
social welfare, basic education, and public health.  Even though most of the public 
investments and services in which villages are involved are largely financed from above, 
some crucial resources are still provided by the village level and their provision is supported 
by the villages. With the call to extend public finance and service delivery into the rural areas, 
the importance of the village level as a (quasi) government for rural citizens is likely to 
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increase.    The role of administrative villages will be discussed in detail later in Section 3. 
The second salient feature of rural public finance in China is that government is 
organized in a hierarchical structure, which powerfully shapes the way policies and resources 
reach rural governments.  Because the administrative system is “nested,” policy 
implementation goes through a level-by-level delegation.  The central government issues 
orders and sends resources to the next tier (T), i.e. provinces, and depends on the provinces to 
transmit the resources downward to the lower levels. The provinces in turn delegate to 
prefectures/municipalities, and so on down the hierarchy. In this system, interactions are 
bilateral, involving only two tiers at a time.
9  Given the way this structure is organized, 
central policies and resources aimed at the rural sector – e.g., sannong policies – go through a 
5-step process before reaching their  intended  recipients.  This is illustrated in Figure A.
10 
Figure A.  The Transmission of Sannong Policies 
Step 1:  T1 Æ T2 
Step 2:    T2 Æ T3 
Step 3:      T3Æ T4 
Step  4:       T4  Æ T5 
Step  5:        T5  Æ Rural areas/citizens/farmers 
In this hierarchy, the intermediate levels have significant powers to decide how to transmit 
policies and resources to the next lower level.  This appears especially marked for the 
provinces. Although neither the Constitution nor the Budget Law (1994) assigns specific 
authorities to the intermediate levels, they are given these authorities by delegation, often 
implicitly.  Not surprisingly, this decentralized approach has resulted in differing shares of 
                                                             
9 This explains why the Central Government is unusually small in China, with only 50,000 staff sitting at the apex 
of a public sector that comprises 33 million employees if public service units are included (see World Bank 
2006a).  
10 A number of pilot programs test improvements in administrative efficiency by putting counties directly under 
the administration of the province, or by putting towns directly under the administration of the prefecture. Till 
2008 it is common that put counties directly under the administration of the province (Sheng Zhiguan Xian) in 
fiscal management system. However, while this reduces the number of layers, the principal structure as a nested 
administration is not changed. 
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revenues and expenditures managed by rural local governments across provinces. This 
unusual aspect of China’s public finance system has been noted in earlier studies (see, for 
example, World Bank 2002). It is also confirmed in the four provinces where fieldwork was 
conducted for this study. In each of the four provinces, the county plus township shares of 
expenditures are more than 50 percent of the (subnational) total, significantly higher than the 
national average of 43 percent (Figure B).
11 
Figure B.   Shares of Budget Expenditures by Level (2003) 
 








Source: Compendium of Local Fiscal Statistics, 2003. 
The share of expenditures accounted for by the provincial government also varies 
significantly. The provincial share is perhaps more indicative of choice since, unlike other 
subnational governments, provincial governments have no clear role in the direct provision of 
services. While averaging 28 percent nationwide (when the four provincial-level 
municipalities and Tibet are excluded), this share ranges from lows of 13 and 14 percent in 
Zhejiang and Guangdong, to highs of 49 and 43 percent in Qinghai and Ningxia respectively.
12 
The summary descriptive statistics in Table 2 for the 27 provinces and autonomous regions 
                                                             
11 By themselves, these different shares of the rural sector may be merely reflections of the different degrees of 
urbanization across provinces. For example, as measured by the share of agriculture in provincial GDP, the four 
fieldwork provinces are all significantly more “agricultural” (and rural) than the national average. The shares of 
the primary sector in provincial GDP in 2003 were 1.44, 1.42, 1.37, and 1.22 and in 2004 1.40, 1.34, 1.34, and 
1.23 times the national average in Sichuan, Yunnan, Jiangxi, and Henan, respectively (Statistical Yearbook 2004, 
2005). 
12 MOF (2003); Compendium of Fiscal Statistics for All Prefectures, Cities, and Counties, 2003. 
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show the diversity of choices made by provinces. 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics of Subnational Expenditure and Revenue Shares, 2003  
Expenditure shares   Mean  Std. Dev.  Maximum  Minimum  C.V. 
Province 28.0%  9.1%  49.4%  12.8%  0.33 
Prefecture 24.4%  8.0%  48.9%  15.0%  0.33 
County + township  47.7%  8.2%  63.2%  30.3%  0.17 
 Revenue shares 
Province 22.1%  8.2%  42.4%  11.4%  0.37 
Prefecture 31.2%  6.8%  50.9%  19.0%  0.22 
County + township  46.7%  10.8%  65.2%  22.1%  0.23 
Note: Data exclude Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Tibet. 
Source: China Prefectures, Cities and Counties Fiscal Statistics 2003. 
These features of the current intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in China explain two 
notable outcomes in rural public finance in China:  First, the wide variation in the fiscal 
environments faced by rural local governments in different regions, both in terms of how much 
autonomy they have in spending decisions, as well as resources available for meeting their 
expenditure responsibilities.  Second, it is not a straightforward process for the central 
government to implement changes in rural policies since these changes are mediated by several 
intermediate levels of government. 
2.2.  Expenditure Assignments 
Expenditure responsibilities are only defined in broad terms for central and “local” (i.e. 
sub-national) authorities in the Budget Law (1994). The law leaves it to the subnational 
governments to work out how to divide “local” responsibilities and revenues among the four 
levels. Table 3 shows the broad assignments under the Budget Law. 
Table 3.  Division of Responsibilities between the Central and Local Governments 
Central Government  Subnational Governments 
1.  National defense  1. Local government administration 
2.  Diplomacy and foreign affairs  2. Local public services 
3.  Military police  3. Locally financed basic infrastructure & technical 
renovations 
4.  Key construction projects  4. Support to agriculture 
5.  Central Government administration 5. Urban maintenance and construction 
6.  Public services at the central level  6. Price subsidies 
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7.  Debt service payments  7. Other expenditures 
Source:    Adapted from the Budget Law (1994). 
Given the absence of specific assignments, in a broad sense the four levels of subnational 
governments share joint responsibility for all functions not assigned to the central government.  
In practice, concurrent assignments are common, with all four levels of subnational 
governments engaged in virtually all budgeted activities (World Bank 2006a).  This is 
illustrated in Table 4, showing a range of major services provided by several levels of 
government, including rural governments at the county and township levels. 











Higher education  x  x  x     
Intermediate education    x  x  x  x 
Basic education        x  x 
Culture x  x  x  x  x 
Basic R&D  x  x  x     
Health x  x  x  x  x 
Family planning      x  x  x 
Administration x  x  x  x  x 
Law and justice system  x  x  x  x  x 
Social security    x  x  x  x 
Source: Adapted from Zhao et al. (2005). 
These assignments are largely inherited from the planned economy, when they were 
designed for purposes of administration, rather than finance.  For ease of administration, 
responsibilities were mostly divided by catchment areas, rather than by function, and the 
system explicitly permitted concurrent assignments.
13  For example, in education, primary 
and junior middle schools are the responsibility of subprovincial government at the lowest 
level – districts and “street communities” in urban areas, and townships in rural areas.
14  
                                                             
13 This principle also permitted state-owned enterprises – using pre-tax profits (i.e. state funds) – to run schools 
and clinics and hospitals for their own staff and their dependents, phenomena that were common with Soviet-type 
economies. 
14 "In July 2001 the State Council issued an edict that counties should pay all rural teachers salaries for primary 
through junior middle schools.  Implementation began in 2002 in most provinces but negotiations are continuing 
in many localities over whether the State Council intended a change in expenditure assignment, or simply a 
cashiering responsibility --  where the county would disburse against township funds." 
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Senior middle schools are usually the responsibility of a higher-level government – 
municipalities and counties.  Provinces are usually involved in education at the university 
level (where the central government is also involved).  Lower-level governments that have 
resources can and do offer more – townships sometimes have their own senior middle schools 
and technical vocational schools, and large municipalities often have their own universities.  
At the same time, provinces directly finance some primary and middle schools that are attached 
(and subsidiary) to provincial-owned universities and organizations. 
What emerged from this system of informal expenditure assignments was that 
responsibilities for basic education and public health were primarily at the lowest tiers, where 
the schools, clinics and hospitals are located.  This is how counties, townships and city 
districts came to account for 60 percent of total public expenditures in education and more than 
40 percent of those for health.  Likewise, social welfare relief is the responsibility of the 
lowest tier, sometimes jointly with the next higher level.  For example, the “five guaranteed 
households”, a rural welfare program for elderly with no family support, was the responsibility 
of the village community. 
Rural local government expenditures are overwhelmingly concentrated in the provision of 
social services, administration, and economic services.  In aggregate terms these three 
categories together account for 75 and 80 percent of expenditures at the county and township 
levels, respectively (Table 5).  Recent reforms have moved some expenditure assignments 
from the township to the county level – most notably the payment of teachers’ salaries in 
2002-2003. While these changes have affected the relative shares between the township and 
county levels, they do not represent a reduction in the responsibilities for rural governments 
(counties plus townships) as a whole.  Instead, many new programs have been rolled out in 
rapid succession, thus adding to expenditure burdens.
15 
                                                             
15 Examples include the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), the recently announced “free rural 
education” program, the rural minimum living stipends, and others.  See World Bank 2008. 
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Table 5.  Composition of Budgetary Expenditures of Rural Local Governments, 2004
16 
(Shares of total)  All Subnational 
Gov'ts 
Counties Townships 
1. Capital Investments  22% 17%  9% 
2. Economic Services  13% 14%  14% 
Agriculture  3% 4%  7% 
3. Social Services  32% 37%  36% 
Education  15% 21%  24% 
Health  4% 5%  2% 
4. Administration  21% 24%  29% 
5. Subsidies  2% 1%  1% 
6. Others  10% 7%  11% 
Provision of Services (2 + 3 + 4)  66% 75%  80% 
Source: Compendium of Local Fiscal Statistics, 2005. 
Local rural governments have had great difficulty in adequately assuming their 
expenditure responsibilities, although little information is collected systematically in China on 
the state of services delivered on the ground. However, the high average proportions of total 
expenditures devoted to service provision imply that many rural counties and townships at the 
lower end of the income distribution are unable to fund their expenditure responsibilities at 
adequate levels.
17  Even for the key national priority task of providing nine years of basic 
education, for example, the Ministry of Education found that at year-end 2002, 431 counties 
had not reached this target, nearly all of which are in remote mountainous areas.  Together 
these counties had a population of 107 million – more than one-eighth of the rural population 
(Wang Zhan 2003).
18 
This picture of poor localities straining but failing to provide adequate services can be 
glimpsed in anecdotal evidence collected during fieldwork for this study.  The 2003 
consolidated budget (including both the county and its townships) for Hua county, a nationally 
                                                             
16 Social services include basic education, public health, and social welfare.  Economic services include the 
operating expenses of the agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and industrial departments, and the agencies in 
charge of water conservancy. 
17 This is consistent with the findings of empirical studies, such as World Bank (2002), Heberer (2001) and Chen 
and Han (2005).  
18 The number of counties unable to provide 9 years of schooling has declined rapidly under the current campaign 
to extend compulsory education to all. By the end of 2004, the number of counties not achieving this target had 
been reduced to 284. Even in 2007, though, 93 counties still could not meet this target. 
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designated poor county in the central province of Henan, is presented in Table 6. 
Table 6.  Budgetary Expenditures in Huaxian, 2003 
 Expenditure Category: 
Per capita 
(RMB) 
Share of total 
budget 
Administration 68  22% 
Education 120  39% 
Agriculture (incl. forestry, water cons., meteorology)  23  7% 
Health 10  3% 
Social assistance/relief  15  5% 
Capital construction  17  6% 
Other 56  18% 
Total   308  100% 
Source: fieldwork, December 2004. 
Even though Huaxian devoted 39 percent of its budgetary expenditures to education, 
nearly twice the national average for counties, it managed to spend only RMB 678 per student 
enrolled in basic education, or 62 percent of the national average.
19  With education taking up 
a large part of available revenues, and administration taking another 22 percent, Huaxian was 
hard-pressed to find resources to meet all of its responsibilities.  Compared to other counties, 
it spent proportionally less on capital investment, health, and economic services. Even though 
the county is a major grain producer, Huaxian also spent comparatively little on agricultural 
services. In 2003 the budget allocated only RMB 23 per capita for the operating costs of all 
departments related to agriculture, less than one-tenth of that spent in Ninglang county in 
Yunnan, a remote and mountainous locality that had little agriculture to speak of. The Huaxian 
county government provided no funding for any other economic services. 
2.3.  Revenue Assignments 
In order for rural local governments to deliver the many assigned vital (and often costly) 
services, the IFS must assign sufficient revenues to them through own taxes and user charges as 
well as through transfers. Given the very large regional disparities in income and revenue 
capacity across regions, transfers play an important role in alleviating horizontal inequities. If 
this condition is not met (either because of inadequate own revenues and/or inadequate 
                                                             
19 See World Bank (2005a); national figure calculated from Chinese Finance Yearbook, 2004. 
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transfers), the outcome is an inadequate provision of services and large disparities in services 
across localities.  Where resources are inadequate, shared responsibility often leads to higher 
levels of government delegating responsibilities to lower levels of government.  This was 
especially true in China during the long fiscal decline (Wong 1991, 1997; World Bank 2002). 
Since 1994, all taxes have been assigned to the central government, “local” government, or 
shared.  At the outset, the Tax Sharing System (TSS) reform of 1994 had aimed to simplify the 
revenue sharing system by introducing a simple, transparent, and uniform structure for revenue 
assignments across provinces. The system was introduced with only a few shared taxes – the 
VAT (75 percent central and 25 percent local) and the resource tax (assigned to either central or 
local government by type of resource). 
In practice, the system of revenue assignments remained very complicated, especially at 
the subnational levels.
20 In many localities, especially at the township level, “fiscal contracts” 
were retained, under which the local government either received or remitted a lump-sum 
amount or a proportion of revenues (Zhou et al. 2005).  The TSS simply added a new layer to 
the division of revenues – in Chinese this is commonly referred to as the “simultaneous 
implementation of two (revenue-sharing) systems.”  In addition, the extension of the TSS to 
the subnational level began late, and has been implemented differently in different provinces. 
The current situation is that “local” taxes are extensively shared among subnational levels.  At 
the county and township levels, rural local governments collect a relatively large number of 
taxes, but draw their revenues mainly from a few taxes.  
Nationwide, the VAT, business tax (BT), and the income taxes (enterprise and personal) 
are the main sources of revenue for all levels of government as well as for both the county and 
township levels.  In 2003 these four taxes combined accounted for 54 percent and 53 percent 
of total revenues at the county and township levels, respectively. The importance of these taxes 
suggests that they are the focus of local revenue mobilization efforts.  
At the same time, through the 1990s in nearly all provinces the intermediate levels – the 
provinces and the municipalities – laid claim to a share of the taxes collected in the counties 
and townships, making it an increasingly uphill battle for the lower levels to increase revenues. 
                                                             
20 This is discussed in detail in World Bank (2002, Chapter 2). 
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This is illustrated in Table 7, which assembles information from three municipalities, two from 
Liaoning and one from Shaanxi, whose situations are not atypical.  Table 8 assembles data 
from townships in four provinces to show that, at the bottom of the administrative hierarchy, 
townships have to “share” revenues from these taxes with the counties after the provinces and 
municipalities have taken their cuts, again, with strikingly different treatment across provinces.   
The multiple claims by different levels of government to the few revenue-rich taxes point 
to the potential for tension that is inherent in the present system of tax assignment and tax 
sharing. Under conditions of fiscal stress, the temptation for higher levels to “grab” revenues is 
undoubtedly great, and the Constitution provides no protection for the lowest levels of 
government. 
Table 7.  Multiple Claims to the Main Taxes, 2003 
Tax Type 
Government level (Tax Share in Percent) 
VAT BT EIT PIT
Central Government  75  0  60 60
Provincial Government  10  30  20 15
municipal level 5  30  5 10
Anshan Municipality 
county level  10  40  15 15
municipal level 6  28  8 10
Liaoning Province 
Panjin & Yingkou Municipalities
county level  9  42  12 15
Provincial Government  7.5  30  20 20
municipal level 2.5  10  .. .. Shaanxi Province 
Hanyang Municipality 
Liquan county  15  60  .. ..
Sources: World Bank (2006a); Zhao et al. (2005). 
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Table 8.  Sharing Township Taxes, 2004. 
Province Hunan  Chongqing  Jilin  Jiangsu 
County X.  N.  F.  T. H.  J.  Y.  W. 
  
Township       T.  Y.  K.  M.    
Province         12.5  12.5  12.5     
County             3.75  12.5  25  18.75 
VAT 
Township 25 25  25 25  25  12.5  8.75     6.25 
Province      40  40  50  50  50     
County       35  30      50  100  40 
BT 
Township 100  100 100 25  30 50  50      60 
Province 12  12       16  16  16    
County                 40*  16 
EIT 
Township 28 28  40 40  40  24 24 24    24 
Province 12  12   16  16  16  16  16    
County       4          40*  16 
PIT 
Township 28 28  50 20  24  24 24 24    24 
Source: fieldwork survey. 
The high dependence on turnover and enterprise taxes also implies that these fiscal 
resources are unequally distributed, as enterprises are more concentrated in coastal regions and 
peri-urban locations. This is illustrated in Table 9, which compares the revenue compositions 
of selected counties, including two visited by the study team. The poor, agricultural county of 
Huaxian in Henan drew more than half of its revenues from agricultural taxes, three times the 
national average for counties. In contrast, the much more prosperous Shuangliu county on the 
periphery of Chengdu relied on agricultural taxes for only 11 percent of its revenue in 2003, 
and business taxes alone supplied 35 percent of its revenue. 
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Per capita Revenues (RMB)    529  269  637  698 
VAT  18.3%  16.4% 8.2% 13.0%  12.2% 
Business  Tax  24.5% 21.4% 10.8% 21.2% 35.1% 
EIT  6.5% 6.8% 2.6% 9.8% 5.9% 
PIT  4.2% 3.2% 2.4% 4.1% 4.7% 
Urban Maintenance and 
Construction Tax (UMCT) 
5.3% 4.8% 1.6% 7.5% 5.1% 
Agricultural  Taxes  15.9% 24.3% 50.4% 18.6% 11.4% 
Other  Revenues  25.2% 23.1% 23.8% 25.8% 25.4% 
Note: County level includes townships. National average includes counties and county-level 
cities, but excludes districts.   
Source: Compendium of Fiscal Statistics for All Prefectures, Cities, and Counties, 2003. 
 
Outside the budget 
Until the Rural Fee Reform was implemented, townships also depended on extra-budgetary 
fees and levies to finance as much as half of their public expenditures, but aggregate data is not 
available at the national level.  A group of experts at the State Administration of Taxation 
estimated that legally prescribed fees and levies at the township and village levels totaled RMB 
86 billion in 2000 (Yang et al. 2003).  If these estimates are correct, fees and levies would 
have financed roughly one-third of public expenditures at the township level.
21  In addition, 
illegal fees might have added another RMB 40 billion, and unpaid, compulsory labor would 
have contributed an amount valued at RMB 59 billion to total township expenditures. Put 
another way, township finance drew from in-budget resources (own revenues and transfers) 
RMB 187 billion, and RMB 185 billion -- nearly an equal amount -- from extra-budgetary 
resources comprising fees, levies, and labor contributions.  This aggregate picture appears to 
be consistent with data drawn from a survey of 50 townships, which show that in 2000, before 
the RFR, the average township drew RMB 92 from extrabudgetary and self raised funds, 
compared to tax revenues of RMB 119.  Of course, township governments were (and are) not 
                                                             
21 This was equal to 50 percent of the budget expenditures of RMB 187 billion at the township level (CFY 2001). 
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the only government units to depend on extrabudgetary resources in China (Wong 1998, Fan 
1998).  The role of extrabudgetary resources in rural public finance will be discussed further 
in Section 3. 
 
2.4. Aggregate Trends in Rural Public Finance 
Throughout the transition period, governments at all levels have faced enormous upward 
pressure on public spending, while laboring under a steep fiscal decline that was reversed only 
in the mid-1990s. Until the TSS reform introduced a new set of tax instruments and tax 
administration, the relaxation of state control over the economy had led to a rapid erosion of the 
government’s capacity to tax (World Bank 2002; Wong 2005). As the budget shrank from 
more than 30 percent of GDP to less than 12 percent during 1980-1995, all levels of 
government felt the squeeze.  At the same time, rapid economic growth and urbanization 
raised demands for new investments in basic infrastructure and improved services.  In 
education, enrollment rates have risen at all levels, and especially in higher education.  Health 
care spending has risen rapidly. Social safety net expenditures have also increased enormously 
as a result of reforms in state-owned enterprises and the aging population.  As explained in the 
section earlier, most of these demands fell on local budgets.  In addition, wages have risen 
steeply during the transition, driving up the cost of labor-intensive public services – again 
hitting subnational budgets harder.
22 Figure C shows that, as a share of GDP, subnational 
expenditures fell from 18 percent in 1978 to 8.3 percent at the nadir in 1996 despite growing 
demands and the rising costs of local services.  Under a transfers system that had been 




22 This was true starting in the 1980s (Wong 1991).  
  19 



































Rural Subnational Gov't Total
 
Source:  Calculated  from  Compendium of Local Fiscal Statistics. 
While the TSS saved the Chinese fiscal system by reversing the fiscal decline, its impact 
on rural public finance was more adverse. Some salient trends are presented in Table 10 to 
show the changing status of rural public finance. From the mid-1980s, under decentralization 
both revenue and expenditure shares were increasing for the rural sector and the two were 
closely balanced. After the central government recaptured a majority share of revenues in the 
TSS reform in 1994, the trends were reversed.  The county and township governments’ share 
of revenues fell sharply, from 30 percent in 1992 to only 17 and 18 percent in 2004 and 2005.  
On the expenditure side their share fell only moderately, from 31 percent in 1992 to to 28 
percent in 1998 and 29 percent in 2002.  The result of these divergent trends was the growth of 
a vertical fiscal gap for these local levels, to 8 percent in 1998 and 14 percent in 2005 (or, in 
GDP terms, to 3 percent). 
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Table 10.  Trends in Rural Public Finance 
(percent)  1986 1988 1990 1992   1998 2000 2002 2005 
Rural share of total 
expenditures 
24.7 28.3 29.7 30.9   28.2 26.2 28.6  32.6 
County 19.2  21  21.3  21.6    19.9  18.9  21.9  26.7 
Township 5.5  7.3  8.4  9.3    8.3  7.3  6.8  5.9 
Township share of rural  22.3  25.8  28.3  30.1    29.3  27.8  23.7  18.1 
Rural share of total 
revenues 
21.7 28.6 28.4 30.1   20.3 19.7 17.1  18.2 
County 12.5  17.1  16.1  16.6    11.5  12  11  13.3 
Township 9.2  11.5  12.3  13.5    8.8  7.7  6.1  4.9 
Township share of rural  42.4  40.2  43.3  44.9    43.5  38.9  35.6  26.9 
Fiscal gap for rural  -3  0.3  -1.3  -0.8    -7.9  -6.6  -11.6  -14 
County -6.7  -3.9  -5.2  -5    -8.5  -6.9  -10.9  -13.4
Township  3.7  4.2 3.9  4.2   0.6  0.4 -0.7 -1 
As % GDP  -0.7  0.1  -0.3  -0.1    -1  -1.1  -2.1  -2.9 
Note: * The fiscal gap is measured as revenue share minus expenditure share.   
Source:  Compendium  of  Township  Financial Statistics, 1986-1992; World Bank (2002); 
and MOF provincial dataset 2003; and Compendium of Local Fiscal Statistics, 2005. 
More importantly for the rural areas, the TSS also produced sharply divergent trends for 
townships and counties. Up through 1992, township revenues had grown rapidly, due to the 
rapid growth of township and village enterprises, and they financed growing expenditures. 
These trends were reversed after the TSS.  Between 1992 and 1998, the township share of 
revenues fell steeply, as the product taxes from TVEs were converted to VAT, whose revenues 
were mostly captured by higher-level governments – as discussed earlier.  Township revenues 
continued to fall from 1998 to 2005, with the RFR and the reassignment of the EIT cutting into 
the rural tax base.  The abolition of the agricultural taxes also added to this decline. In 2005 
townships accounted for less than 5 percent of total revenues – compared to 13.5 percent in 
1992. 
The township’s share of expenditures also fell from 1992 onward, albeit more slowly than 
revenue. This decline is mainly caused by the reassignment of some functions to the county 
level – for example, education, which had absorbed up to 40 percent of township expenditures, 
was reassigned to counties starting in 2002.  In the 1990s it may have also reflected a squeeze 
on services provided by townships (and villages) as their revenues declined. 
In contrast, the county’s share of expenditures has increased since the late 1990s even 
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though its revenue share remained relatively constant.  Consequently, the relative power 
between the county and township level has shifted significantly toward the former.  By 2005, 
the share of the township in the combined (county plus township) budget was only 27 percent 
on the revenue side and a mere 18 percent on the expenditure side.  These figures in fact 
understate the relative decline of the townships, since the Rural Fee Reform implemented 
beginning in 2001 has sharply curbed their ability to raise fee revenue and accelerated the 
process of “hollowing out” of the township level (Kennedy, 2007).  The effect of the RFR has 
hollowed out village finances as well. 
The overall trend for the rural sector is toward greater central control.  Given the growing 
fiscal gap, rural local governments are increasingly dependent on central transfers, which, 
ceteris paribus, reduce local government autonomy.  Within the rural sector, too, there is a 
clear centralization toward the county, away from townships and villages, and further from the 
people. 
3.  The Organization of Rural Public Finance 
The intergovernmental fiscal system sets the rules and determines the resource envelope for 
rural public finance.  In this section we turn to exploring what happens on the ground, at the 
grassroots local authorities.   
3.1.  The County 
The county is arguably the most important level of grassroots government, and for achieving 
the objectives of building the NSC. The number of county-level jurisdictions has declined 
rapidly in recent years, as an increasing number are being reclassified as urban districts and 
county-level cities as urbanization has spread throughout China.  In 2007 there were 2,804 
county level units, including 1,580 counties, 368 county-level cities, and 856 urban districts.
23  
Excluding county-level cities and districts, a typical county has 20 towns and townships, 
perhaps 300 villages, and a population of close to a half million, the vast majority (on average 
85 percent) of whom are rural.  Agriculture is the largest sector in terms of employment and 
                                                             
23 Including national minority autonomous counties. 
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often still the largest sector in terms of GDP.  However, the diversity among counties in size, 
administrative structure, socio-economic situation, etc. is enormous. For example, a county can 
have a population ranging from 10,000 in some remote areas to well over 1 million; and a GDP 
as small as RMB 10 million or larger than RMB 10 billion. 
The administrative structure of county government largely corresponds to that of higher 
levels, but with some variation. Under the “dual rule” system, many county government 
departments receive instructions from both the county (the Party committee and county head) 
and administrative guidance from counterpart agencies at higher levels. Almost universally, 
the institutional structure consists of the Party committee; the government; the people’s 
congress and the people’s consultative conference; and the judicial organs such as the courts 
and procuratorate. A typical county government has 25 or more departments or agencies, each 
of which has a counterpart in the province and at the central level.  Usually attached to the 
county government are hundreds of public service units (PSUs), including hospitals, primary 
and middle schools, and other units providing services.  Included under PSUs are units with 
core government authority such as the local tax offices stationed in the townships,
24 as well as 
units that are managed largely as commercial entities.  The bulk of county government staff is 
employed in these PSUs. 
                                                             
24 Anomalously, township level fiscal and tax offices are in many provinces classified as PSUs, rather than as core 
government departments. 
  23 
In absolute terms the fiscal capacity of counties has increased steadily over the last decade.  
Since 1995, fiscal expenditures of counties (excluding county-level cities) have increased by 
close to 15 percent annually, but with slower growth in the 1990s and very substantial growth 
of around 20 percent since 2000. While county budget expenditures were RMB 323 per capita 
in 2000, they had more than doubled to RMB 731 in 2005 (Table 11).    During the same period, 
though, the share financed from own revenues had fallen steadily, from around half in the 
mid-1990s to only one-quarter in 2005.   
























1995 183  0.47 192 19% 0.70  0.67
1996 227  0.50 233 21% 0.72  0.73
1997 250  0.50 254 9% 0.71  0.72
1998 267  0.53 267 5% 0.80  0.74
1999 308  0.49 300 12% 0.88  0.71
2000 325  0.46 323 8% 0.84  0.72
2001 418  0.40 405 26% 0.87  0.77
2002 495  0.34 489 21% 0.87  0.74
2003 569  0.34 557 14% 0.90  0.77
2004 647  0.31 636  16% 0.91  0.78
2005 731  0.25 727 14% 1.04  0.87
Source: Based on Compendium of Fiscal Statistics for All Prefectures, Cities, and Counties, 
various years.   
There is tremendous variability across counties.  This is shown in the last two columns of 
Table 11, where the coefficients of variation in per capita own revenues and own expenditures 
are large, and have been growing.  Per capita expenditures of the fiscally richest quintile of 
counties (excluding urban units) exceed those of the poorest quintile by more than 4 (4.2 in 
2003),
25 a disparity that is large even in light of cost differences in service delivery and 
different expenditure assignments across counties. While the ratio has declined somewhat 
since the beginning of the decade, it is still higher than in 1995 (of 3.9).  In fact, this picture 
understates the real extent of disparity across localities.  Since the capacity to raise 
                                                             
25 Calculated from Compendium of Fiscal Statistics for All Prefectures, Cities, and Counties, various years. 
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non-budgetary resources is correlated with land values, which are in turn correlated with 
economic growth, a more comprehensive picture that includes budgetary and non-budgetary 
expenditures would likely show even greater disparities across counties.  
Moreover, the inequalities between counties are large even within provinces, as well as 
across provinces (Table 12).  These differences may be partly explained by the heterogeneity 
within provinces, especially in a huge province like Sichuan; they may also reflect the different 
emphases individual provinces place on fiscal equalization.  Through the decade of 
1995-2005, there was no clear trend of decline. 
Table 12.  Variation of County Budget Expenditures by Selected Provinces 
  Sichuan  Henan Zhejiang  Jiangsu  Shanxi Jilin Hebei 
1995  0.65   0.37   0.41  0.26  0.31   0.46   0.33 
2000  0.73   0.34   0.40  0.33  0.43   0.44   0.32 
2003  0.84   0.29   0.41  0.38  0.30   0.40   0.30 
2004  0.83   0.34   0.45  0.41  0.32   0.43   0.38 
2005  0.81   0.37   0.38  0.39  0.34   0.41   0.35 
Note: Measured as Coefficient of Variation in Per Capita County Budget Expenditure. 
Source: China Prefectures, Cities, and Counties Fiscal Statistics, various years. Authors’ 
calculations. 
3.2.  The Township 
Townships and towns are the lowest level of the five-tier government structure. In 2007 there 
were some 34,400 townships and towns. Due to a continued push to merge or eliminate 
townships, the number is decreasing rapidly (Table 13).  The average population of a 
township is about 24,000. With the exception of a small portion of the population residing in 
the township seat, township residents have a rural hukou (household registration). A typical 
township has 15 administrative villages, but this number differs widely from region to region.  
Table 13.  Declining Number of Townships 




72,153 55,838  47,136 43,735  35,509  34,379 
      of which: towns  - -  - -  18,888  - 
  Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007, China Statistical Abstract 2008. 
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The core township institutions are broadly similar to those of the county and higher levels 
of government. They include a Party committee, specific government sectoral offices, the 
people’s congress, the procuratorate and judiciary, mass organizations,
26 etc.  However, this 
traditional structure is changing. For example, it is not uncommon for the Party committee, the 
Government Administrative Office, and the people’s congress to be combined into one unit, 
“the office of the Party and government”.  In addition, the townships have a number of PSUs. 
In the past, these were often referred to as “seven stations and eight offices”, but recent 
organizational reforms have promoted mergers to create fewer (3-4) “service centers”.  For 
example, the agricultural, husbandry, irrigation, agricultural machinery and technology, and 
forestry units are often merged to create an “agricultural service center”; the arts, sports, and 
communication sectors into a “cultural service center”; and those sectors related to social 
security into a “social services center.”
27 
The role of townships has varied substantially over time and space, but over the last few 
years they have generally been demoted and become increasingly subordinated to counties.  
Townships are descended from the former people’s communes, which had been largely 
self-contained units that provided for basically all public goods and services.  The process of 
emergence of the township varied widely across provinces, however, and the capacity of the 
replacement organs often depended on whether and how much collective assets there were to 
inherit.  As a result, the division of responsibilities between townships and counties varied 
across regions, and remained quite fluid (Wong 1997 and World Bank 2002).  Townships also 
assume limited responsibility for rural health care and for social safety, and were responsible 
for basic education until 2002.  In recent years, as the central government has assumed major 
responsibility for rural infrastructure, the earmarked transfers for project finance are largely 
turned over to county management.  
The core responsibilities of townships are increasingly limited to a few areas, such as those 
                                                             
26 For example, the Communist Youth League, the All-China Women’s Federation, etc.  
27 This township government structure might be called “one office and three or four centers”. Despite formal 
changes in structure, the centers still assign their employees responsibility for different jobs, such as agricultural 
techniques, agricultural machinery, culture, and communications, etc. Therefore, in practice there has not been a 
major change. In our interviews, most of the leaders in the township government still used the old names to 
describe their internal organization. 
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related to agriculture or family planning. Of course, townships have responsibility for 
implementing the policies of higher-level governments and for assisting in the administration 
of higher-level programs, but as subordinate agents of the counties rather than independent 
levels of government.  
Township finances are largely determined by the “county-township fiscal system”, where 
the rules are established essentially independently in each county.  A “contract” is negotiated 
between the county and its townships and might differ even among the various townships 
within the same county.
28  Typical elements of a county-township contract stipulates the 
“bases” for expenditures, usually made on the basis of the salaries and operational expenses for 
which the township is responsible; the “bases” for the sharing of local revenues; rules for the 
sharing of the surplus or deficits between actual revenue collection and the revenue “bases”; 
“system remittances”’ or “system subsidies”; and rules on how often the contract would be 
renegotiated. The rules – and indeed all the arrangements – are highly discretionary and often 
set incentives that are undesirable from a macro point of view.
29  The sources and composition 
of township revenues in Table 14 shows the ‘hallowing out’ of township finance. 
Table 14.  Structure of Township Revenue, 2000 and 2004 
 2000  2004 
 RMB/capita percent  RMB/capita  Percent
Local Taxation Income  95  100  129  100 
    Value-added  Tax  18  19  20  16 
    Business  Tax  13  13  42  33 
    Income  Tax  for  Enterprises  6  6  5  4 
    Individual  Income  Tax  7  7  7  5 
    Agricultural  Tax  19  21  26  20 
    Agricultural  Specialty  Products  Tax  13  14  0  0 
    Occupied  Land  Tax  1  1  3  2 
    Other  Income  18  20  26  20 
Township-to-County Transfers  34    93  
                                                             
28 Important adjustments that determine the sharing of funds (and, hence, power) for several years, such as those 
on the level of “bases,” are usually the outcome of extensive negotiations between county and township 
governments. Anecdotal information from our field work suggests that final documents are issued after five or 
more rounds of discussions. 
29 For example, the incentives for townships to fulfill their revenue base might be so strong that they borrow funds 
– reportedly even from neighboring townships – in order to be perceived as fulfilling their revenue base. 
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 2000  2004 
 RMB/capita percent  RMB/capita  Percent
County-to-Township Transfers  58  84 
Disposable Fiscal Resources    119  119 
Total Extra-budgetary Income  55  53 
Total Self-raised Income (incl. tiliu) 37  10 
  Tongchou (township levy)   20 0 
  Tiliu (village accumulation)  14  0 




Total Fiscal Revenues  211    182   
Source: fieldwork survey. 
3.3.  The Village 
Villages figure prominently in the NSC as the basic unit of the xiaokang society in the 
countryside.  In 2005, China had a total of 640,139 administrative villages (China Statistical 
Yearbook 2007).
30 A typical “administrative village”
31 (cun) generally has a population of 
1,000 to several thousand people, but can be as small as only a few hundred or as large as 
10,000 people. The average village in our sample survey of 100 had a population of about 
1,400 people, a labor force of about 700, an average net rural income of RMB 2,600 (2004), 
and a total cultivated area of about 2,270 mu (150 ha).
32  Most administrative villages consist 
of a number of “village groups” that are generally established at the level of a natural village. 
Usually an administrative village comprises only a few village groups, but some have up to ten 
or even more in the more mountainous areas. These natural villages are the most basic unit of 
the community; the administrative village is formed to have sufficient scale for local 
administration and the provision of basic public services.  
Village administrations are “self-governing,” and are led by the Party.  By law, the village 
assembly is the highest authority in village self-governance. Day-to-day activities of 
self-governance are carried out by the village committees. The village head (village committee 
director) and village committee members are elected by the villagers. However, the village 
                                                             
30 The number of village committees has declined by about 11.5 percent in the five-year period from 1999 to 
2004.  
31 The traditional term “administrative village” is used here, since the formal term “village committee” has a 
second meaning referring to the self-governing organization of the village. 
32 This sample is described in detail in World Bank (2007 - RPF), Annex 5. 
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committee is subordinate to the village Communist Party secretary, who is a nominated 
official.
33 
The specific authority of the village administration, and hence the scope of village finance, 
is largely undefined and varies widely in practice.  As noted earlier, villages play an 
important, albeit supplementary role, in implementing government policies and in the 
provision of public services.  For example, a road or an irrigation canal passing through a 
village may be formally “owned” by the township, but in practice the township government 
takes little responsibility for the operation and maintenance of most small-scale infrastructure. 
Likewise, responsibility to provide a social safety net may formally be a government 
responsibility, but the village may still feel the need to engage in this area if the government 
fails to provide adequate funding.  However, the willingness and ability of the various village 
administrations – under the leadership of the Party secretary – to engage villagers in the 
provision of public services vary enormously.  Moreover, the authority of the village 
administration vis-à-vis that of the township is not clearly defined and varies quite widely in 
practice.  
The township usually has a strong influence over village finances, including in the direct 
payment of village cadres.  In fact, most village accounts today are administered by the 
township, and village accounting books are kept with the township. This is intended to reduce 
corruption at the village level by taking the financial accounts away from the village 
leadership, but it also limits village authority, and incentive, to manage its own business. 
Village revenues are very limited, and constraints have become more accentuated over 
time.  The sources of village revenue are shown in Table 15, which shows village revenues of 
about RMB 80 per capita in 2004.  The salient feature of village finance is the preeminence of 
non-budgetary sources of revenue.  For the “average” village in our survey, only RMB 23 
                                                             
33 Usually, the village-level Party institution is a branch of the Party committee at the township level rather than a 
Party committee itself, so the village-level head is a head of the Party branch committee. The relationship between 
elected village committees and village Party committees can be contentious. Measures to mitigate this problem 
include encouraging the village Party secretaries to run for village head, so that he/she combines both positions 
(one shoulder pole – yi jian tiao), or experiments such as those in Shandong or Handan of Hubei that aim at 
standardizing the power of the respective bodies and include the establishment of a “joint conference of the village 
Party branch and the village committee” (Fewsmith 2006). In addition to the village committee and the Party 
committee, most villages have so-called small groups (xiaozu) for financial affairs, cultural affairs, etc. 
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came from in-budget revenues, from transfers and the expanded agricultural tax surcharge.  
All the rest – nearly RMB 60 – came from fees and rental incomes from collective assets.  In 
2000, before the rural fee reform abolished the tiliu (village fee assessment), the portion of 
nonbudgetary revenues was even higher.  
Table 15.    Village Revenue by Categories, 2000 and 2004 
2000 2004  in RMB per capita 
Mean  % of total  Mean  % of total 
1  Transfers from above  4.6  5.9  17.8  21.7 
2  Regular fee assessments (tiliu) 30.0  38.1 0.2 0.2 
3  Surcharges on agricultural tax  0.2  0.2  4.7  5.7 
4  Contract payments for land  8.1  10.3  12.0  14.6 
5  Contract payments for enterprises  5.8  7.4  7.9  9.6 
6  Land and asset sales  15.8  20  23.5  28.6 
7 Other  revenues  14.3  18.2  16.0  19.5 
8 Total  revenues  78.7  100  82.1  100.0 
Note: “Other revenues” include income from: administration fees charged to village 
enterprises; shared profits with village enterprises; fines for violating the birth control policy; 
fines for other penalties; interest, rents, and repayment of credits; collective operations; etc. 
Source: 2005 Village survey data. 
Villages vary tremendously in terms of their financial strength, investments, and provision 
of public goods and services. This is shown in Table 16.  In 2004 per capita village revenues 
were highest in Jilin and Jiangsu, with RMB 156 and RMB 110, respectively. Villages in these 
two provinces also received the highest transfers. Transfers to other provinces were much 
smaller, with total village revenue in Sichuan amounting to only RMB 23 per capita. Similarly, 
per capita capital investments in villages ranged widely, from RMB 353 in Jiangsu to only 
RMB 63 in Hebei, and per capita village debt was as large as RMB 542 in villages in Shanxi 
and only RMB 91 in villages in Sichuan. 
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Table 16.    Village Financing by Province and Poor Villages in 2004 
RMB per capita  Total  Jiangsu   Sichuan   Shanxi   Jilin   Hebei   Poor 
Revenues  82 110  23  48  156  41  134 
Transfers from above  18 20  9  7 42  3  46 
Total Expenditure, incl. 
debt-financing 
95 168  56  52  104  50  85 
Recurrent Expenditures  40 62  20  27  54  22  38 
Repayment of Principal  13 9  8  8  34  4  29 
Total Capital Expenditures  42 97  28  18  17  24  20 
Deficit/Surplus  -13 -58  -33  -4 52  -9 50 
Total Public Goods 
Investment 
191 353  215  156 78 63 171 
Total Village-level 
Liabilities 
253 177  91  542  275  355  664 
Note: “Poor” is defined as the 20 percent poorest villages. 
Source: 2005 village survey. 
3.4. Beyond the Budget: Financing Rural Infrastructure 
Infrastructure investments are the driving force behind village finance; this is especially true in 
recent years.  Fieldwork studies and survey research consistently find investment in 
infrastructure such as roads, water supply, irrigation, etc., to be considered the most important 
public functions played by village authorities (e.g. Zhao et al 2006, Zhang et al 2007, Yi et al. 
2008).  This was reflected in Table 16, where public goods investments far outstripped 
recurrent expenditures in the 100 villages surveyed.  It is further highlighted in Table 17, 
where, on average, villages spent RMB 42.5 per capita for capital investments in 2004, 
compared to recurrent spending of RMB 40.1. 
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Table 17.    Village expenditures by category 
2004 
RMB per capita  Mean  % of total 
Expenditures for recurrent costs  40.1  64 
   S a l a r i e s   14.4  21 
   Administration  6.7  13 
   M a i n t e n a n c e   8  15 
   Social  welfare  6.1  5 
   O t h e r s   5  9 
Repayment of principal  12.9  16 
Capital investment expenditure  42.5  33 
   Financed  by  current  rev  17.3  21 
   Financed  by  debt  25.2  12 
Total expenditures excl. debt  70.3  100 
Total expenditures incl. debt    95.5  112 
Source:  2005  village  survey. 
 
  Nationwide, spending on rural basic infrastructure has increased enormously in recent 
years.  Reflecting the tilt toward the rural areas, the government took the opportunity of the 
fiscal stimulus program (introduced in 1998) and the new resources created through state bond 
issues to channel additional funding to rural infrastructural investments.  In 1998 alone, the 
amount jumped by RMB 30 billion, leading to a near tripling of expenditure from the level of 
10-15 billion in the mid-1990s (Figure D).  Since 2003, annual spending on rural basic capital 
investment has remained above RMB 50 billion. 


























Source:  CSY  2007. 
  The increased funding from the central government enabled an enormous expansion of 
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investment in rural areas, with ramifications through all three levels of rural authorities.  
Under the current intergovernmental assignments, the responsibility for infrastructural 
investment is dispersed among all levels of government in China. Until 1985, at the subnational 
level all capital expenditures were approved and financed by the provinces, but they have since 
been devolved to each locality (World Bank 2002).  All three levels of rural government 
engage in infrastructural investments, financed largely with extrabudgetary resources 
including debt. 
  As local governments are not legally permitted to borrow, however, this has created a 
dilemma where local governments are reluctant to report on debt – and the capital investments 
they financed.  Moreover, the planning and budgeting for capital investment is not integrated 
with the budget, and reporting is scattered.  For these reasons, complete and accurate data on 
infrastructural investments are virtually nonexistent in China. 
Paradoxically, because they are not required to submit periodic reports to the fiscal system, 
which focus on budgetary resources and largely ignore nonbudgetary items, village accounts – 
to the extent they exist – tend to present a more comprehensive treatment of resources used.    In 
this section we rely heavily on village accounts and extrapolate from them to other levels. 
  The increased central funding has created more local spending requirements.  In the 
villages surveyed, annual infrastructural investments almost quadrupled from 2000 to 2004.  
Table 18 shows per capita investment rising from RMB 48 in 2000 to RMB 191 in 2004, while 
the share of government financing jumped from 21 to 59 percent.  In 2000, when villages were 
largely financing infrastructure on their own, village commitments accounted for about 47 
percent of the total.  In addition, households contributed about 18 percent through special 
assessments on farmers (jizi).  The picture changed dramatically by 2004, when transfers from 
higher level governments financed 59 percent of the total, or more than RMB 100 per capita.  
Because of the quadrupling of total spending, however, contributions from the villages also 
increased in absolute terms, from RMB 23 in 2000 to RMB 44 in 2004, and that from 
households from RMB 9 to RMB 21.  In addition, since the data in the table looks only at 
financial investments and excludes the unpaid labor input by the villagers themselves, it 
understates household contributions to infrastructure by about RMB 10 per villager, about 5 
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percent of total investment. 
Table 18.    Funding of Village Capital Investments 







   2000 
Roads & Bridges  15  23 47  29 2 
Irrigation & Drainage  10  42 31  21 5 
Drinking Water Supply  4  5 2  4  90 
Others
a 19  12 66  11  11 
Total 48  21 47  18  14 
   2004 
Roads & Bridges  124  65 23  11 1 
Irrigation & Drainage  20  51 28  10  11 
Drinking Water Supply  18  43 24  19  14 
Others
a 30  52 13  7 28 
Total 191  59 22  11 8 
a. Others include schools, clinics, electricity, office buildings, green for grain, telephones, 
cable television, broadcasts, etc. 
b. Others includes donations from abroad, donations from enterprises, donations from 
universities, small group investments, private investments, investments from power supply 
corporations, investments from broadcast bureaus, etc. 
Source: 2005 village survey. 
The same process has also driven up expenditures for infrastructure at the township and 
county levels.  According to our survey of 50 townships, in year 2000, investments were 
only RMB 77 per capita for building roads, schools, irrigation, and other public goods 
infrastructure projects.  By 2004, this amount had nearly tripled, to RMB 217.
34  A t  t h e  
township level a large part of the increase was for rural roads, which accounted for more than 
half of total investments in 2004 (Table 19). 
                                                             
34 The townships are not always aware of infrastructure investments in their villages that are financed purely by 
the villages themselves. Hence, the figures presented underestimate the total capital investments in a township. 
This also explains, at least in part, the differences between what is stated here and what is stated by the villagers 
(see section below) regarding the share financed by the village. 
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Table 19.    Funding of Township Capital Investments 
Percentage from…  Mean 




Total  77 26 64  10 
   Roads  &  bridges  22  23  57  20 
   Irrigation  11  48  31  21 
   Drinking  water  8  45  49  6 
   Schools  26  16  83  1 
   Clinics  1  11  89  0 
   O t h e r
b 9  24  75  1 
   2004 
Total  217 53  37  10 
   Roads  &  bridges  115  60  30  10 
   Irrigation  31  32  58  10 
   Drinking  water  17  67  18  15 
   Schools  19  43  53  4 
   Clinics  4  58  42  0 
   O t h e r
b  31 45 43  12 
a: Total sample is 50 townships in five provinces; only 48 townships have complete 
information; 1 missing in Shaanxi and 1 missing in Hebei. 
b: Others include electricity, office buildings, green for grain, telephones, cable television, 
broadcasts, etc. 
Source: 2005 township survey. 
Increasing capital investments have put enormous pressure on village, township and 
county finances, at a time when reforms are sharply cutting revenues especially at the village 
and township levels.  As shown in Table 19 for the townships surveyed, township 
contributions have in fact declined substantially as a share of total capital investments, from 
almost two-thirds (64 percent) in 2000 to just 37 percent in 2004. Nevertheless, this still 
represented an increase in absolute terms, from about RMB 49 per capita in 2000 to RMB 80 
per capita in 2004. 
 
Land, asset sales, and debt 
 
It had been shown earlier in Table 15 that regular fee assessments (tiliu) had provided some 
40 percent of revenues for villages in 2000, and a roughly equal amount was drawn from 
contract payments for land and collective enterprises and land sales.  With the rural fee 
  35 
reform eliminating the tiliu but receiving only 60 percent in revenue replacement transfers in 
2004, villages had to rely more heavily on the latter, especially land-related fees and the sale 
of land use rights and other assets.  Among 100 surveyed villages, the number selling land 
rights increased from 3 to 4 per year in the early 1990s to 24 in both 2003 and 2004, or nearly 
one-quarter of our sample.  Other assets, including buildings, equipment, and timber, were 
increasingly sold as well – we found almost a tripling in the frequency of sales, from 10 times 
in 1998 to 29 times in 2004. Revenue from these sales in 2003 and 2004 that went to the 
village (after netting out compensation to households) averaged RMB 35,000 per village, in 
addition to the RMB 35,000 for land-related transactions. 
Nationwide, revenues from land transactions have become an important part of the 
income of local governments at the municipal, county, township and village levels.    Official 
data show that from 2001 to 2003, total revenue from land-use right transfer fees was as high 
as RMB 910 billion (World Bank 2005a).  In some municipalities and counties, these 
revenues were greater than the governments’ fiscal revenues.    In addition, local governments 
are increasingly taking out loans using requisitioned land as collateral through the creation of 
“land banks,” and these loans have become an even greater source of funds than the land-use 
right transfer fees in many areas.  Together, a joint State Council Development Research 
Center-World Bank study found these land transaction-related revenues to be financing 80 to 
90 percent of total investment in infrastructure in many areas (World Bank 2005a, Zhang 
2007). 
Aside from selling assets, local governments are borrowing.  Our survey found total 
village liabilities amounted to more than RMB 250 per villager in 2004.
35  This implies a 
total debt of all villages in China equal to about RMB 240 billion.    Table 20 shows the size 
and sources of village debt in 2004. 
                                                             
35 There are large differences across provinces in the magnitude of these debts (Table 16). The highest debt was in 
Shaanxi, at RMB 462.1, followed by Jilin (RMB 397.2), and then Hebei (RMB 338.6), Jiangsu (RMB 145.2), and 
Sichuan (RMB 45.4). 
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Table 20.    Village Liabilities in 2004 
RMB per capita  Mean  Percentage >0  Percent of total 
1 Total  253  86  100.0 
2 Financial  institutions  120  58  47.5 
3  Higher levels of government  21  25  8.2 
4 Enterprises  36  46  14.1 
5 Unpaid  wages  14  41  5.7 
6 Farmers  42  53  16.4 
7 Other  21  25  8.2 
8  Estimated % to be repaid  55     
Source:  2005  village  survey. 
Selling assets and borrowing are common mechanisms used by governments around the 
world to finance capital investments.  If managed properly, these are considered efficient 
and equitable means of finance for long term capital. As long as the investments yield returns 
greater than or equal to the financing costs of these debts, the debts should be financially 
sustainable, and there is no intergenerational transfer of burdens.  In all  countries, however, 
the challenge is to keep a close watch over local borrowing to ensure macroeconomic 
stability and sustainability.    What is worrisome in the Chinese case is the lack of transparent 
information on the scale of local government debt and its growth.  Based on data from 57 
counties in three provinces, Wang (2006) estimates county government debt to be as high as 
14 percent of GDP. As for the sale of land use rights, the need to impose limits is urgent, to 
safeguard farmers rights and ensure adherence to national priorities for urbanization and food 
security.  Given the current ambiguous property rights over agricultural land, the risk of 
abuse of farmers is high. 
4  Institutional Impediments to Improving Rural Public Finance 
The discussion above has highlighted the diverging trends between recurrent and capital 
spending at the village and township levels:  while reforms were reducing the role of these 
two levels in the provision of social services and moving resources and responsibilities to the 
county, policies to improve rural infrastructure were having the opposite effect – creating 
growing burdens for villages and townships and exacerbating their fiscal gaps.    This section 
turns to the institutions and organization of government to identify some impediments to the 
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efficient functioning of rural public finance.  These include the weak and constrained 
planning and budget processes at rural governments, the distorted incentives embedded in the 
personnel system for public employees, the multiplicity of government agencies managing 
agriculture and rural affairs, and the weak information system for monitoring and evaluating 
rural development. 
4.1.  The Planning and Budgeting Processes 
Despite the high degree of expenditure decentralization in China, local governments lack 
formal autonomy over budget decisions (World Bank 2002, OECD 2005).  All taxing power 
resides with the central government, and local governments have little leeway for revenue 
mobilization within the budget. 
On the expenditure side, the large and growing number of spending mandates cascading 
down from higher levels constrain allocative autonomy at the lower levels.  When aggregated, 
these mandates sometimes exceed the fiscal and administrative capacities of local 
governments.  For rural governments, this is exacerbated by the multiplicity of upper level 
agencies that are making policy and sending directives downward.  
The high dependency on transfers, in a system where more than half of the transfers are 
earmarked for specific spending purposes, also severely limits the fiscal authority of local 
governments. On average, county governments depend on transfers for about one-half of their 
expenditures, and the share is much higher for townships and villages, as well as for poor 
counties.
36   
The weaknesses of the transfers system are legion, chief among them leakage and lateness.  
Sitting at the bottom of the multi-tiered administrative system, rural governments are the most 
disadvantaged. Funds often do not reach them in line with the annual budget process or even 
the next planning period. Uncertainties in the availability of specific projects and of transfer 
funds further undermine local budgeting. In fact, expenditures financed by earmarked transfers 
are frequently not included in local budgets at all because the funds do not pass through the 
                                                             
36 In keeping with the new practice of Ministry of Finance, these figures for transfers exclude tax rebates. 
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fiscal system, and reconciliation is done at a later time, if at all.  We found, for example, in 
fieldwork to Ninglang County (Yunnan), that more than half of the budgetary expenditures are 
not budgeted by the county.  Similarly, in Huaxian we spoke with township leaders who 
basically had no information about a road project in their township, since it was implemented 
by the county.  Zhao et al. (2005b) reports that “no one at the grassroots levels has a 
comprehensive account of earmarked subsidies that pass through their territorial unit.” 
The usefulness and efficiency of large numbers of often small projects designed at higher – 
often central – level is questionable. This is illustrated by the agricultural departments in 
Huaxian, a poor county in Henan.  The county’s Agriculture Bureau received and 
implemented 13 different types of project transfers in 2002 and 2003, an increase from 10 in 
2001. The average size of these transfers, aside from a large “good seeds” project worth RMB 
4 million, was only around RMB 150,000.  In addition to the Agricultural Bureau the county 
has many agriculture-related line bureaus, including an Animal Husbandry Bureau, an 
Agricultural Mechanization Bureau, a Forestry Bureau, a Water Resources Bureau, a Grain 
Bureau, a Land and Natural Resources Bureau, a Comprehensive Agriculture Development 
Bureau, etc. All of these have their own earmarked transfers. 
The personnel system imposes another severe constraint on county governments’ ability to 
implement a better budget process. Decisions on the complement of agencies and staff 
positions assigned are approved by a joint Party-government agency set up at each 
administrative level and by higher-level committees that ultimately report to the State 
Commission on Public Sector Reform.  Local governments have little power to change their 
formal institutional and personnel structures. Moreover, the salaries and benefits of 
government employees are also determined by the higher levels.  Since personnel costs are by 
far the largest component of expenditure for local governments – accounting for some 70 
percent of total subnational budgetary expenditures in 2004, taking the decision power over 
personnel out of the budget severely undermines the budgeting process. 
The personnel system creates distortions in local government incentives.  Nominally, 
China maintains a nationally unified civil service system under which the central authorities set 
the basic salary scales and levels, and these apply to public employees at all administrative 
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levels.  National standard salaries for a country as large and diverse as China naturally lead to 
overpayment in the economically poorest areas and underpayment in richer areas relative to the 
economic strength and salary levels of those localities.  To compensate, rich areas provide 
large supplementary payments to “top up” basic salaries, and these are generally much less 
controlled.
37  In poorer areas, the overpayments contribute both to excessive staffing costs and 
growing pressure to add staff.  These tendencies have been greatly exacerbated by the rapid 
growth in government salaries in recent years -- 15 percent p.a. during 1998-2003, and with 
another hefty increase in July 2006 (CFY 2007).  
In practice, local governments often add more employees than approved, resulting in 
“overstaffing.”    Overstaffing, i.e., local governments employing more staff than the number of 
approved posts, is widespread in China, and was found by the study team in all three counties 
visited.
38  On the one hand, the hiring of such additional staff may reflect a mismatch between 
officially approved posts and staffing requirements. More often, though, this is a way for local 
government leaders to support specific individuals and their families, in particular since the 
hiring process for such staff is usually much less transparent than that required, for example, 
for civil servants at higher-level governments. Moreover, a number of county governments still 
regard it as their responsibility to offer jobs to any college graduates of their county, if they 
cannot otherwise find a job. This tendency to increase staffing levels leads to soft budget 
constraints for county governments since salary payment for all government-employees is the 
top priority of the government and a cause for bail-outs by higher-level governments.   
The pernicious effect of overstaffing on rural services can be glimpsed in the example of 
agricultural agencies in an extremely poor county in Yunnan (Table 21), where overstaffing 
had inflated personnel costs to absorb the entire budget, leaving little operating costs to provide 
services.  As a result, the staff in these bureaus rarely went to the fields since there was no 
                                                             
37 During the salary reforms starting from 1998 the Central Government had called for a Sunshine Salary that 
would put all salary items into a formal payment list, but to date the policy has not been implemented as a 
national standard. 
38 Additional staff are usually hired in PSUs rather than in core government agencies, and they often have a 
different employment status than regularly-hired personnel. 
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money for fuel for the agency vehicles.
39  
Table 21.    Uses of Budget Appropriations for Agricultural Units, Ninglang County, 
2003 
(RMB 10,000)  Total Salary  Operating 
Agriculture Bureau*  251.0  249.5 (99.4%)  1.5 (0.6%) 
Animal Husbandry Bureau  106.8  105.5 (98.8%)  1.2 (1.2%) 
Forestry Bureau  367.6  365.6 (99.5%)  2 (0.5%) 
Note: The Agriculture Bureau excludes the Animal Husbandry Bureau, but includes the Farm 
Machinery Bureau, Seed Bureau, etc. 
4.2.  The Organizational Structure at the Central Level 
Compounding the complicated transmission of policies and resources downward is the 
complexity of communication horizontally across government agencies.  Currently many 
government agencies are involved in the financing and implementation of public goods and 
services for rural development, including at the central level. Under the leadership of the State 
Council, the two “super-ministries,” i.e., the National Development and Reform Committee 
(NDRC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), have the greatest decision-making power. They 
are not only planning and coordinating bodies for the other line agencies, but they also channel 
funds through their own systems. For instance, the Food-for-Work (FFW) poverty program 
and other infrastructure-related programs are administered by the NDRC; the Comprehensive 
Agriculture Development (CAD) program is implemented by the State Office for CAD under 
the MOF (SOCAD) and its corresponding agencies at the subnational level.  
The line agencies with the most direct involvement in agriculture and rural development 
include the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Water Resources (MWR), Ministry of 
Land and Natural Resources (MLR), State Forestry Administration (SFA), Leading Group 
Office of Poverty Reduction (LGOPR), and State Grain Administration (SGA). Many others 
have leadership responsibility over vital services that are provided in rural areas, including the 
Ministry of Education (MOE), Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA), 
Ministry of Communications (MOC), Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS), 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Central Meteorological Administration 
                                                             
39 Fieldwork, February 2004. 
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(CMA), the State Administration of Quality Supervision and Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ), and even the Commission for Science and Technology and Industry for National 
Defense. A summary presentation is shown in Figure E below.  
Many other central-level agencies are also involved in rural development, though not 
necessarily in the implementation of interventions that use central fiscal resources. These 
include mass organizations like the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), the Communist 
Youth League (CYL), and the Supply and Marketing Cooperatives. Of course, last but not 
least, the most powerful organs defining rural development and its financing are those Party 
and “hybrid” (Party and government) agencies such as such as the Leading Group for 
Financial and Economic Affairs and the State Commission on Public Sector Reform 
(SCPSR).
40 




MOA  MLR  MWR  SGA  SFA  LGOPR 
SEPA  CMA  MOST MOCA MOH 
State Council
Source: Adapted from the website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC: 
http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2005-08/01/content_18608.htm; Xinhua information.  
Responsibilities at the central level are not clearly delineated, and gaps and overlaps of 
responsibilities and lack of coordination lead to inefficiencies.  For example, there are 
overlapping responsibilities between the NDRC, broadly responsible for planning, and the 
MOF, responsible for budget planning (and execution).  A lack of coordination can lead to a 
situation where the NDRC’s planning and approval of capital investments are not in line with 
                                                             
40 The official English-language name of this committee, often referred to as the “post establishing committee,” is 
the State Commission on Public Sector Reform. 
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the MOF’s planning and allocation of recurrent costs for the operation and maintenance of an 
investment. Similarly, some types of investment funded through and implemented by SOCAD, 
e.g., for land preparation or irrigation and drainage, might also get support from the MWR or 
the MOA or, in poverty areas, the LGOPR or the NDRC-administered FFW program. 
However, there is no centralized monitoring and evaluation system that allows the central 
government to comprehensively assess the overall programs; in which counties, townships, 
and villages they are implemented; and their efficiency and impact. 
The complexity of this fragmented and overlapping structure becomes more concrete 
when looking at specific functions. For example, Liang (2003) points out that “the present 
administrative management system … still carr[ies] the characteristics of the planned 
economy. Problems of division among departments and detachment of management continue 
to exist, especially in managing agricultural and rural economic affairs. According to statistics, 
fourteen ministries and commissions (or administration bureaus) are involved in governing the 
process before, during, and after production. Among them, eight agencies are involved in the 
management of the quality and safety of farm produce, eight for agricultural investment, six for 
processing and distribution of farm produce, and five for management of agricultural 
production materials.”  Since each agency allocates funding in its functional area, this 
complex management structure would tend to produce and perpetuate the current 
fragmentation and earmarking of central transfers into numerous programs. 
This organizational structure at the Central level is mirrored at all four other levels of 
government, further adding to the complexity.   The structure of government agencies 
described for the central level is largely replicated at the province, prefecture, and county 
levels. At the township level, so-called “stations” or “centers” and their staff correspond to the 
government structures at the higher levels.
41 
Basically all of the functions covered by the various agencies at the central level are 
covered by those at each of the subnational levels as well.  Responsibilities are not restricted 
                                                             
41 Variations exist across localities, generally due to historical reasons. For examples, some provinces, 
prefectures, or counties might have both a Bureau of Agriculture and a Bureau of Animal Husbandry, with both 
reporting vertically to the MOA; or there might be a “Rural Affairs Office” and an Agricultural Commission with 
larger, coordinating functions across sub-sectors. 
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to policy-making and implementation, but often involve the channeling of funds and, not 
infrequently, the need to allocate fiscal resources at many government levels. 
5.  Recent Reforms and Their Impact 
The rural sector has been the arena for some of the boldest fiscal reforms during this decade. 
Starting with the Rural Fee Reform in 2001, a number of measures have been introduced – the 
abolition of agricultural taxes, adjustments to the Tax Sharing System, the yixian weizhu 
reform to move the payment of rural teachers’ salaries to the county level, the reform to put 
counties directly under provincial administration, the “three rewards and one subsidy” 
program, etc. All of these have aimed at strengthening rural public finance. They reflect a clear 
recognition by government that rural governments are operating under severe financial 
constraints, and that problems of rural public finance constitute a bottleneck to building a 
harmonious, well-off society.  
Eliminating rural fees and abolishing agricultural taxes were by far the most important 
reforms affecting rural public finance in recent years.  Because they were implemented close 
together and their effects are similar and cumulative, these two reforms are often lumped 
together and considered as part of a comprehensive reform of rural taxes and fees called the 
“rural tax and fee reform” (农村税费改革).  However, we will discuss the two reforms 
separately since they were driven by different motives, and have different impacts on rural 
public finance.  Nevertheless, throughout this report we will also adopt the shorthand of “rural 
tax and fee reform” to refer to these two reform programs, hereafter RTFR.   
5.1.  The Rural Fee Reform 
In a speech in April 2000, then-Vice Premier Wen Jiabao called the RFR one the most 
important reforms in the rural sector over the past 50 years, whose impact is comparable to that 
of the Land Reform in the early 1950s and the return to household farming in the early 1980s.
42 
The RFR was first piloted in Anhui province starting from the late 1990s. It was adopted for 
                                                             
42 “Vice Premier Wen Jiabao speech at the conference on disseminating Anhui’s experience and mobilization for 
RFR pilots, April 13, 2000.”  Reprinted in State Council RFR Work Group (2001). 
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step-by-step nationwide rollout in 2001, with implementation in most provinces in 2002 and 
2003.  
In introducing the RFR in 2000, Premier Zhu Rongji explained the reform in this way: 
“Promoting the RFR is the fundamental strategy for protecting the legal rights of 
farmers and reducing their burdens. The basic approach in the RFR is to raise – by an 
appropriate amount – the existing rates of the agricultural tax and the agricultural 
special products tax, while abolishing all administrative fees that are levied on farmers, 
including the unified township levy and the village accumulation levy.”
43  
The reform began with twin objectives: to reduce the overall fiscal burden on farmers and 
to impose a more structured framework for financing government at the grassroots levels by 
bringing previously extra-budgetary revenues and expenditures on budget. These objectives 
were intertwined: the fact that grassroots governments were financed mostly off-budget prior 
to the RFR meant that they generally operated free of oversight from higher levels and 
unrestrained by tax laws. The proliferation of fees and their growing burden on farmers were a 
major cause of widespread rural protests in the late 1990s.
44  Thus, the RFR was an important 
component of the nationwide reform of extra-budgetary fees beginning in the late 1990s that 
sought to curb the growth of extra-budgetary revenues and bring them onto the budget as much 
as possible (World Bank 2002). 
According to official statements of the time, it appeared that the RFR began as a tax 
rationalization and budget reform measure that sought to bring township and village finance 
more fully into the budget. By banning extra-budgetary levies, the government aimed to harden 
the budget constraints and curb the excesses in “taxing and spending” at the grassroots level. 
Prior to the RFR, there was a common saying in the countryside: “the first tax is light, the 
second tax is heavy, and the third tax is a bottomless pit” (toushui qing, ershui zhong, sanshui 
shi ge wudidong). The “first tax” referred to the agricultural tax. The “second tax” was the 
                                                             
43 “Speech at the CCP Economic Work Conference, November 28, 2000.” Reprinted in State Council RFR Work 
Group (2001). 
44 These are well documented in two popular books on the plight of farmers. Cao (2000) and Chen and Chun 
(2004). See also Bernstein and Lu (2003). 
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township and village levies that were explicitly permitted, and the “third tax” was the 
additional fees, levies, compulsory investments, and donations that local officials often used to 
fund capital investments and other extra-budgetary expenditures. The RFR merged the “first” 
and “second” taxes and eliminated the “third” tax, thereby significantly reducing the overall 
burden on farmers. More importantly, by fixing the tax rates and tax base, the reform set an 
upper limit for the farmers’ tax obligations. Henceforth, fund-raising for infrastructural 
investments would require approval by village assemblies. 
The positive outcomes of the RFR are unambiguous. The overall burden on farmers was 
dramatically reduced as the numerous ad hoc and sometimes abusive and excessive fees and 
levies were eliminated.  In the first years of the reform, it had also brought a large component 
of extra-budgetary revenues into the budget for unified allocation, in the form of an expanded 
agricultural tax. In the words of one official in Henan province: “The RFR raised the quality of 
resources by concentrating them in the fiscal system” rather than through fees collected by 
disparate agencies and local governments. 
To help offset the loss of revenue from the RFR in 2001 the central government introduced 
the rural fee reform subsidy. The RFR subsidy is allocated across provinces according to their 
level of development by the formula of “1-8-5-0.”
45 
To illustrate the impact of the RFR, some calculations for Henan, a category 1 province, are 
presented in Table 22. They show that in 2000, prior to the RFR, fees and levies had accounted 
for some 82 percent of the revenues available at the township level in the province, while 
agricultural taxes accounted for only 18 percent of the total.  After the RFR, in 2002 the 
expanded agricultural taxes generated roughly half of the revenues in the rural sector.  
Transfers from the central and provincial governments together provided another 36 percent of 
the total. In the reform plan, it was assumed that a modest level of voluntary contributions from 
farmers (RMB 15 per capita per annum) according to a case-by-case approval method (yishi 
yiyi) would provide 13 percent.  These calculations left a funding gap of 4 percent in 2002 – a 
                                                             
45 Under this formula, provinces are divided into four categories to replace revenues by the RFR subsidy: (i) 
central and western provinces that are grain “exporters,” 100 percent; (ii) central and western provinces that are 
not grain “exporters,” 80 percent; (iii) coastal provinces that are grain “exporters,” 50 percent; and (iv) coastal, 
non-grain-exporting provinces, 0 percent. 
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small amount to be offset by cost savings. The total “burden reduction” to farmers was 39 
percent (with tax payments and voluntary contributions totaling RMB 6.23 billion).
46 As it 
turned out, since farmers did not approve any contribution under the yishi yiyi system, the 
actual burden reduction was 48 percent. Depending on how much village-level infrastructure 
was built and financed by the government, this left up to 17 percent less revenue available for 
spending. 
Table 22.    Rural Revenues Pre- and Post-RFR in Henan 
Revenue source (RMB billion)  2000 2002  (actual)  change 
Agricultural tax  0.9  3.73  +2.83 
Agricultural tax surcharge (20%)  -  0.75  +0.75 
Agricultural special products tax  0.66  0.19  -0.47 
Slaughter tax  0.05  0.06  +0.01 
Special products tax on tobacco  0.2  0.2  0 
Total agricultural taxes  1.81 (18%)  4.93 (51%)  +3.12 
Township unified levy  2.6  0  -2.6 
Village levy  2.35  0  -2.35 
Other fees and levies  3.4  0  -3.4 
Total non-tax revenues  8.35 (82%)  0  -8.35 
    Central government subsidy  -  2.82 (29%)  +2.82 
    Provincial subsidy  -  0.7 (7%)  +0.7 
    Farmers voluntary contribution* -  1.3 (13%)  1.3 
Total available revenue  10.16  9.75  -0.41 (4%) 
Total paid by farmers  10.16  6.23  -3.93 (-39%) 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to shares of total available revenues 
* Projected, with a ceiling set at RMB 15 per year from farmers. 
Source: Fieldwork, and Henan Statistical Yearbook 2004. 
5.2.  Associated Reforms of the RFR Program 
From the outset, the architects of the RFR program had planned for restructuring rural 
governments and reducing staff to be core components of the RFR that would provide cost 
savings to offset revenue losses from the fee reductions.
47  In a speech to the National RFR 
                                                             
46 It should be noted that the calculations and reported figures for the impact of the RFR on the “burden reduction” 
should be used with care. While all calculations show substantial impacts, reported numbers are often not exact 
and not fully consistent. 
47 These are included in the Implementation Document on the RFR issued in 2000: Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee Document No.7, jointly issued by the CCPCC and State Council. Reprinted in State Council 
RFR Work Group (2001). 
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Work Conference in November 2000, Vice Premier Wen Jiabao stated: 
“Here I want to emphasize several points: First, in the process of piloting the RFR, the 
localities should stay focused on reducing farmers’ burdens and ensuring discipline in 
grassroots government behavior. The reform should start by reorganizing government 
and reducing staff to cut expenditures, rather than relying wholly on central transfers to 
fill fiscal gaps. Central transfers are to be used only as a transitional aid to ensure the 
normal functioning of grassroots governments.”
48 
In many localities there were proposals to consolidate villages, townships, and school 
districts to create more efficient scales for service provision, along with calls for reducing staff 
in schools and government agencies  (State Council RFR Work Group, 2001). Following 
issuance of CCCPC Document No. 30 in December 2000, the Central Committee Office and 
State Council Office jointly issued a document calling for an average 20 percent reduction in 
the number of staff posts at the municipal (prefectural), county, and township levels, to be set 
by the provincial authorities and implemented on a level-by-level basis.
49 This call is reflected, 
for example, in Huaxian (Henan province), in an implementing document on the RFR calling 
for a reduction of “no less than 27 percent” in staff size in government and Party organizations, 
and controlling the overall number of public service unit (PSU) staff. The document calls for 
limiting the number of posts to 30 in small townships, and 35 in large townships. In villages, 
the number of officials is to be limited to 5-7 in large villages with a population exceeding 
5,000, and 3-5 in most villages. To further control costs, subsidies for village officials are to be 
kept at no more than RMB 200 per staff per month. Non-production-related expenditures 
should also be controlled, including setting limits on subscription fees for newspapers and 
magazines and abolishing entertainment expenditures at the village level. According to the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, 876 townships in 20 provinces were dissolved or merged in the first 9 
months of 2004, bringing cuts of some 86,400 jobs and RMB 864 million in budgetary 
                                                             
48  Speech on November 4, 2000. Reprinted in State Council RFR Work Group (2001). 
49 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Office and State Council Office, “Some Opinions on Personnel 
Downsizing at the Municipal, County, and Township Levels,” December 26, 2000. Reprinted in State Council 
RFR Work Group (2001). 
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savings.
50  
These associated reforms are crucial to sustain the “burden reduction” objective of the 
RFR reform. As illustrated by the numbers in Table 22 above, subsidies from higher-level 
governments replaced about 35 percent of the pre-RFR revenues in 2002, accounting for 
two-thirds of the reduction in farmers’ burdens.  To prevent the burden from “rebounding” or 
negatively affecting public expenditures, additional sources of savings would have to be found.  
One such source is improved efficiency due to farmers’ participation in project selection. For 
the first time, the RFR presents the public with the possibility of choice – farmers can vote 
(with a two-thirds majority) to “tax” themselves to undertake infrastructural investments (yishi 
yiyi). This new arrangement will presumably weed out unwanted projects and ensure a more 
responsive pattern of investment. Another potential source of savings is from cutting rural 
administration and raising efficiency in service provision. The reform design of the RFR 
explicitly relies on these efficiency gains to alleviate burdens also by encouraging farmers’ 
involvement in the delivery of goods and services. 
5.3.  Agricultural Tax Abolition (ATA) 
The RFR was quickly followed by the abolition of agricultural taxes. In 2003 the government 
announced that beginning in 2004 provinces should try to reduce the agricultural tax rates (just 
raised to 7 percent under the RFR) by 1-3 percent per year, to reach a zero rate by 2007. This 
reform was further accelerated, with the government announcing in December 2005 that the 
tax had already been abolished in all but three provinces.
51 By early 2006, it had been 
completely abolished nationwide.
52 Building on this momentum, in February 2006 the 
agricultural special products tax and the slaughter tax were also formally abolished.
53 
  The ATA was a response to the growing complaints that the agricultural taxes were unfair.  
                                                             
50 China Daily, November 17, 2004. 
51 These were Hebei, Shandong, and Yunnan.  Even in these provinces, the tax had been abolished in more than 
210 counties.  Jin Renqing interview in People’s Daily, December 31, 2005. 
52 The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Abolishing the Regulation of 
the People’s Republic of China on the Agriculture Tax, issued December 29, 2005, formally abolished the 
agricultural tax effective January 1, 2006. 
53 Decision of State Council Order No. 459, issued on February 17, 2006, for immediate implementation. 
  49 
The architects of the RFR reform had not anticipated that the expanded agricultural tax, within 
the context of a substantial overall reduction in “burdens” on farmers, would become a 
lightening rod for criticism.  The reality, though, is that while urban citizens are exempted 
from personal income taxes (PIT) on the first RMB 9,600 of annual income –an amount that 
was doubled in 2005, no such exemption existed for the much poorer rural citizens since 
agricultural taxes were unrelated to incomes.  In this light, the argument that fair treatment of 
all citizens under the tax law required the abolition of the agricultural tax found resonance 
among policymakers.
54  From the perspective of revenue considerations, this was also easily 
affordable since even the expanded agricultural tax, together with the animal husbandry tax 
had produced only RMB 33.4 billion in 2003, equal to 1.7 percent of current revenues (Finance 
Yearbook 2004).  In net revenues terms, the “yield” was even lower for these two taxes since 
they were notoriously costly to collect from the two hundred million rural households. 
  While the ATA was welcomed for bringing further reductions in the farmers’ burdens, it 
injected some confusion into the ongoing reforms and up-ended all the careful plans for 
revenue-replacement under the RFR. Moreover, following so quickly on the RFR, the ATA 
directly undermined two principal objectives of the RFR – that of imposing a more structured 
framework on rural public finance and hardening the budget constraints on grassroots 
governments. Abolishing the agricultural taxes also further diminished the already slim local 
tax base, especially in inland, rural localities where, aside from agriculture, there is little 
economic activity to tax. 
  The immediate effect of the ATA was twofold. First, it imposed a much greater burden on 
central transfers, both in quantity and duration. While transfers were always required under the 
RFR to fill the revenue gap, they were meant to be transitional, and would be reduced or 
streamlined as cost savings are realized from improved efficiencies and associated reforms. 
With the elimination of the agricultural taxes, however, the gap is now larger, and transfers will 
be needed for a long period until new taxes can be found to rebuild the revenue base in rural 
communities. 
  Second, it has created new urgency for implementing the associated reforms to generate 
                                                             
54 See, for example, Yang et al. (2003). 
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some cost savings. On the positive side, the abolition of the agricultural tax has eliminated the 
need in local finance departments for the large corps of tax collectors who had been deployed 
to perform the mammoth task of going door-to-door to collect the tax.
55  Unfortunately, 
progress on downsizing appears elusive.  Available data shows fiscal-supported population at 
the subnational levels continuing to grow, at least through 2005, with the share of county and 
township staff remaining stubbornly static (Table 23). 




(million)  Province Prefecture  County  +  Township 
2000 40  9.1  18.3  72.6 
2001 41  10.5  18.0  71.5 
2002 42  10.8  17.8  71.5 
2003 43  9.8  17.7  72.5 
2004 45  12.6  17.5  69.8 
2005 46  13.9  17.5  68.6 
Source: Compendium of Fiscal Statistics for All Prefectures, Cities, and Counties. 
5.4.  The Immediate Revenue Impact of the RTFR 
The revenue gap at the local level is substantial. As shown in Table 22 earlier, provincial 
officials in Henan had counted on the expanded agricultural tax to replace a significant part of 
the revenues lost from eliminating the fees and levies – roughly RMB 3 billion (compared with 
the RMB 2.9 billion in central subsidies in 2002). With the abolition of the agricultural taxes, 
however, these calculations became obsolete, and a larger gap emerged in rural finance.  By 
2005, agricultural tax revenues had fallen to RMB 360 million, and central subsidies were 
financing more than RMB 9 billion, or three-quarters of rural revenues in the province. 
  What is the size of the revenue gap nationwide?  Many estimates have been made, and 
central government offices have been inundated by wildly inflated reports of “lost revenues” 
from local governments.  Two sets of estimates are presented in Table 24. The first comes 
from a speech delivered by then-Vice Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2000 at a national 
conference on Anhui’s RFR experience, and the second from a group of experts at the State 
                                                             
55 In the counties visited by the mission, up to three-quarters of the staff in township-level finance departments 
were assigned to collect the agricultural tax. 
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Administration of Taxation (SAT).
56 These estimates vary significantly, especially in terms of 
the size of illegal fees and levies and the valuation of compulsory labor – two components of 
the farmers’ burdens for which aggregate statistics do not exist. Under the higher estimate by 
Yang Yuanwei and his colleagues (Yang et al. 2003), prior to the RFR total resources available 
to township governments may have been as high as RMB 216 billion. With the elimination of 
fees and the abolition of agricultural taxes, township governments are almost entirely 
dependent on transfers from higher levels.  Despite a rapid escalation in recent years, central 
subsidies for the RFR and agricultural tax replacement totaled only RMB 98.6 billion in 2006, 
leaving a shortfall of as much as RMB 120 billion for township governments in the aggregate. 
Put another way, according to the estimate of Yang and his colleagues, post-RFR grassroots 
governments have at their disposal less than half as much as before the RTFR. Even under the 
more benign scenario described by (then-Vice) Premier Wen, they have 14-19 percent less. 
Table 24.    The Effect of the RTFR on Rural Revenues 
(billion RMB)  Wen Jiabao  Yang et el. 
Figures from:  1997  circa 2000 
Total collected revenues:  114.3  160 
of which: agricultural taxes    34 
township and village unified levies    59 
other fees and levies    27 
irregular fees and levies  20  40 
plus: compulsory labor contribution  8.1  59 
Total mobilized resources    122.4  219 
Replacement revenues     
Central transfers (2006)*  98.6  98.6 
Revenue loss under the RTFR (1)  -17.5 (-14%)  -61.4 (-28%) 
Revenue loss under the RTFR (2)  -23.6 (-19%)  -120.4 (-55%) 
Note: * includes rural fee reform transfer 75.1 billion and transfer to counties and townships 
in difficulties (three rewards and one subsidy) 23.5 billion. (1) Includes only legally 
permitted fees and levies, and excludes compulsory labor valuation. (2) Includes total 
mobilized resources. 
Source: Wen Jiabao speech at National Conference on Anhui’s RFR Experience, April 13, 
2000 (reprinted in State Council 2001); Yang et al. (2003); Xu (2006) and Jin (2006, 2008). 
  Of course, the revenue impact of the RTFR varies by region and by administrative level, in 
accordance with the respective weight of the agricultural taxes in their total revenue – hitting 
                                                             
56 This group is led by Yang Yuanwei, a leading figure in the Tax Policy Department at the SAT. 
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hardest those localities most dependent on these taxes.  Data in Table 25 below show that 
across provinces, the weight of agricultural taxes varied from 17 percent of total revenues in 
Anhui to nearly zero in Tibet. In this table we provide an illustrative ranking of provinces 
according to the revenue impact of the RTFR.  
  The rankings presented in Table 25 are approximate because the 2003 data already reflect 
some reductions in agricultural tax revenues from the RTFR, and therefore understate the 
effect of the reform on provincial revenues.
57 Excluding Yunnan, Table 25 shows the most 
affected provinces to be Anhui, Henan, and Hubei, where the reforms will reduce revenues by 
some 10 percent or more. At the bottom, there are nine provinces and cities where the impact 
will be less than 1 percent of total revenue, and another eight where the impact will less than 4 
percent of revenue. 



















1. Anhui  12.09  17.12  18. Chongqing  4.72  8.34 
2. Henan  11.96  14.25  20. Jiangsu  3.33  10.17 
3. Yunnan  10.86  13.57  23. Liaoning  2.31  6.18 
4. Hubei  9.96  12.79  28. Guangdong  0.71  4.90 
6. Jiangxi  9.52  10.92  34. Shanghai  0.01  7.54 
15. Sichuan  6.83  8.32  35. Tibet  0.00  0.03 
average  4.75  8.52 
standard deviation  3.76  3.46 
coefficient of variation  0.79  0.41 
Notes: Taxes to be eliminated include the agricultural tax, animal husbandry tax, and 
agricultural special products tax. Shares are as a percentage of total provincial revenues. 
“Provinces” include some major cities such as Dalian and Xiamen.  Yunnan is excluded 
because of the large portion of tax revenues accruing to tobacco, which will not be affected 
by ATA. 
Source: Based on Compendium of Fiscal Statistics for All Prefectures, Cities, and Counties, 
2003. 
                                                             
57 For the agricultural special products tax, for example, the RFR had reduced the scope of what could be taxed 
and reduced the rates by as much as one-half on many products. In Henan, for example, revenues from the 
agricultural special products tax had fallen from RMB 937 million in 2001 to only RMB 271 million in 2003. 
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  At the county level the dependence on agricultural taxes varies even more widely.  In 
Table 26 we present summary data from rural counties in Yunnan and Henan provinces. The 
average share of the five agricultural taxes was 32 percent among counties in Yunnan and 37 
percent in Henan, but the maximum share was around three-quarters in both provinces. The 
2005 data reflects the effect of abolishing agriculture taxes while retaining the tax on tobacco, 
which remains important in some counties, albeit a much smaller number. 
Table 26.    The Share of Agricultural Taxes in County Revenues, 2003 and 2005 
2003 2005 
 
Yunnan Henan Yunnan Henan 
Maximum  77% 75% 50% 26% 
Minimum  1% 5% 0% 0% 
Average 32%  37%  19%  5% 
Standard deviation  14%  16%  14%  5% 
Coefficient of variation  0.46  0.44  0.74  1.16 
Note: This is the sum of five taxes: the agricultural tax, animal husbandry tax, agricultural 
special products tax, farmland occupation tax, and title tax.    The slaughter tax is also often 
included, but this tax generates insufficient revenues to make a difference. 
Source:    Based on Compendium of Fiscal Statistics for All Prefectures, Cities, and Counties, 
2003, 2005. 
  The fact that counties vary so widely in their dependence on agricultural taxes means the 
RTFR may have potentially large distributional impact across localities depending on how 
provinces pass through the revenue replacement subsidies from the central government.  For 
provinces such as Henan, which receives 100 percent replacement for revenue losses, the 
impact could still be differentiated across affected counties depending on the choices made by 
the province.  Agricultural counties in provinces that receive only partial subsidies may be 
more likely to suffer net revenue losses.   
  Finally, the impact of the RTFR falls overwhelmingly at the township level. This is not 
only because townships and villages had been so reliant on fees and levies, but also because 
agricultural taxes had accrued mostly to the township level, and townships were in turn the 
most dependent on agricultural tax revenues.  As shown in Table 27, in 2003, while 
agricultural taxes constituted 8.7 percent of total revenues for subnational governments, they 
were less than 2 percent of provincial revenues but 31 percent of township revenues. The fact 
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that the revenue losses are concentrated at the lowest levels of the administrative hierarchy 
means that central monies have to travel a long way to reach the intended recipients. Under the 
current intergovernmental fiscal system, this path is not assured. 
Table 27.    Share of Agricultural Taxes in Total Revenues by Administrative Level, 2003 
    All agricultural taxes  Agricultural taxes to be abolished* 
Subnational Total  8.7  4.3 
Province 1.6  0.0 
Prefecture 6.3  0.2 
County 8.1  2.6 
Township 31.1  27.3 
Note: * The agricultural tax, animal husbandry tax, slaughter tax, and agricultural special 
products tax. The farmland occupation tax and the title tax remain. 
Source:    Based on Compendium of Local Fiscal Statistics, 2003. 
5.5.  Other Reforms Affecting Rural Governments 
Aside from the RTFR, two other reforms implemented in recent years have had a significant 
impact on rural finances. These are the measure to “complete” the TSS reform introduced in 
2002, and the “three rewards and one subsidy” introduced in spring 2005. Both are policy 
responses to the increasingly evident fiscal problems of rural governments that were 
manifested by the wave of wage arrears for teachers and civil servants and public protests by 
farmers starting in the late 1990s. In his report to the National People’s Congress in March 
2002, noting that many governments at the county and township levels were unable to meet 
their payrolls in full for civil servants, Minister of Finance Xiang Huaicheng called for 
government to “gradually establish a mechanism to ensure normal payment of wages, 
accelerate changes in the functions of counties and townships, and create conditions for 
fundamentally overcoming financial difficulties in counties and townships.”
58   
Completing the TSS reform at the sub-provincial levels 
“Completing the TSS reform at the sub-provincial levels” is a major reform to correct many of 
the problems of the Tax Sharing System. At the first cut, it calls for “completing” the TSS 
reform by eliminating the fiscal contracts that have remained in use at the sub-provincial levels, 
                                                             
58 Reports indicate cumulative arrears of RMB 6.5 billion at year-end 2001 (Xiang 2002). 
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as discussed earlier.  More importantly, the reform aims to inject transparency and order into 
sub-provincial fiscal relations, by simplifying the intergovernmental system, injecting greater 
uniformity in revenue-sharing, and strengthening the fiscal capacity of counties and townships 
(especially the poor ones). 
  This reform was introduced with little fanfare, when the State Council issued a 
“notification” to central agencies and provinces in December 2002. The document calls on 
provinces to:  (1) rationalize and clarify expenditure responsibilities among sub-provincial 
levels, (2) rationalize the division of revenues; (3) improve the system of sub-provincial 
transfers; (4) adjust the fiscal role of townships to fit their economic conditions, specifically by 
reassigning responsibilities of smaller townships in less developed areas to counties.  It also 
calls for strengthening supervision over townships to ensure compliance with national 
regulations against borrowing or providing guarantees for projects; and (5) strengthen budget 
management to improve the efficiency of public expenditures. 
  The most important changes stipulated in the document, aside from revamping the 
revenue-sharing arrangements among subnational levels, were the reassignment of some 
functions from the township to the county, and a call to end unfunded mandates being pushed 
on counties. 
  Significantly, the State Council document also calls for a decentralized approach to 
implementing this reform. While the thrust of the reform is to increase resources at the county 
and township levels, the document calls for different treatments depending on local conditions. 
In localities where per capita fiscal disparities are “relatively small,” it calls for reducing the 
provincial and prefectural revenue shares to improve incentives for revenue mobilization at the 
grassroots levels. In localities where fiscal disparities are “relatively great,” it calls for raising 
revenue shares at the higher levels, and using these resources for equalization transfers to the 
counties and townships. In implementation to date, different approaches can be seen across 
localities. In some, provincial authorities have reduced the number of shared taxes at the 
provincial level to leave more resources to the lower levels. In Henan, for example, provincial 
authorities have turned over some 60 percent of the provincial tax base to the municipalities.  
However, the change applies only to “new revenues”, so the effect will be gradual. In Jiangsu, 
  56 
early implementation of these changes reduced the provincial share of revenues to roughly 20 
percent of the total. In contrast, Liaoning province is increasing the provincial share. Even 
within a single province, the direction of change differs across municipalities. For example, in 
Liaoning, Anshan municipality is choosing to end its sharing of the VAT, enterprise income 
tax (EIT), PIT, and business tax collected by the counties. This decentralizing thrust in Anshan 
contrasts with that in Panjin and Yingkou municipalities, which are taking 40 percent of the 
local portion (after sharing with the province) of the VAT, EIT, PIT, business tax, and real 
estate tax collected by the counties (World Bank 2006a). 
The “Three Rewards and One Subsidy” Program 
The “three rewards and one subsidy” program was rolled out in May 2005. It is the product of a 
high-level task force appointed by the National People’s Congress in 2004 to investigate the 
fiscal problems of counties and townships.
59 The program’s stated aim is to “solve” the 
problems of “fiscally poor” counties within three years. The program was funded with an 
allocation of RMB 15 billion from the central budget for 2005.  The amount had risen to 23.5 
billion in 2006, and in 2007 it was 33.5 billion. The program is designed to support and 
enhance completion of the TSS reform by boosting the incentives for revenue mobilization and 
provincial equalization efforts, as well as by the more painful downsizing reforms. It also 
rewards grain-producing counties to offset their fiscal disadvantages. 
6.    Summary and Conclusions 
Government efforts to channel resources toward pro-poor, pro-rural programs continue to 
gather momentum.  Addressing an assembly of the Political Bureau in Beijing in February 
2008, President Hu Jintao urged government officials at all levels to devote themselves in 
building a government ‘by the people, for the people’, and one that ensures all Chinese enjoy 
the fruits of the country's economic development.  "The government should provide education 
                                                             
59 This information is based on MOF Document No. 77, May 8, 2005, “Notification on the 2005 Central 
Budgetary Rewards and Subsidies to Local Governments in Providing Assistance to Counties and Townships 
to Resolve Fiscal Difficulties,” and interviews at MOF, February 2005. 
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for the young, medication for the ill, care for the old-aged and housing for the homeless."
60  
This was earlier voiced at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, which reaffirmed the 
importance of upgrading public services in building a Harmonious Society in China.  The 
Report of the Congress emphasized that on the basis of economic development, more attention 
must be paid to guaranteeing and improving people's livelihood and promoting social reform, 
expanding public services, improving social management, and promoting social equity and 
justice.  Since the most glaring shortfalls in these services are virtually all in the rural areas, 
redressing them will require strengthening rural public finance to provide the resources to 
support these laudable goals. 
  The reforms implemented during this decade have already succeeded in achieving some 
key objectives, chiefly reducing farmers’ burdens, ensuring that teachers’ salaries are paid, 
reducing out-of-pocket costs for schooling, extending the coverage of cooperative medical 
insurance, channeling more resources to rural infrastructure, etc.  Other reforms, such as 
extending the TSS to sub-provincial levels, pilot reforms in provinces directly managing 
county finances, counties managing township finances, treasury reform, the “three rewards and 
one subsidy” program, and the consolidation of jurisdictions (in particular townships and 
villages) have also made progress in the intended direction, but will take more time to produce 
clear effects. For example, completing the TSS reform applies only to incremental revenues, 
and merging townships and villages will also require time to implement and to yield their 
intended results. 
  However, while each of the reforms has achieved specific successes, their overall effect 
has been more mixed.    This is partly due to the contradictions existing among the reforms – for 
example, while several of the reform measures are intended to enhance the fiscal resources of 
county and township governments (as well as village authorities), the RTFR has eliminated a 
good part of their revenue bases.  The number and pace of introduction of recent reforms is 
proving overwhelming at the grassroots levels, especially since the reforms have also brought 
dramatic shifts in authorities and resources among the three levels of rural government.  As a 
result, not all are implemented as intended, and the net effects of these changes on the 
                                                             
60 Xinhua in English, downloaded 2/24/08. 
  58 
efficiency and responsiveness of rural services are as yet unclear.  Some of them could well be 
negative.  
  More importantly, these reforms are not yet moving toward building a healthier, more 
sustainable intergovernmental fiscal system. The reforms have led to a growing vertical fiscal 
imbalance as own revenues have further reduced for local rural governments while the “tilt to 
rural” policies have pushed up expenditure needs. Although under the government’s policy to 
“give more and take less” from the rural sector and more central transfers have been made 
available, this strategy also carries risks.  International experience shows governments tend to 
manage “own” resources better than funds from other sources.  China is already an outlier in 
transfer-dependency, with local rural governments now dependent on transfers to finance more 
than half of their expenditures (two-thirds when tax rebates are included).  The recent trend 
will make it even more so.  While the potential negative effects of a high dependency on 
transfers can be managed through a strong accountability system and, in particular, an effective 
transfer system, such systems are not yet in place. 
  The current intergovernmental transfer system is inefficient and recent equalization efforts 
have been insufficient to offset the growth in income disparities across provinces.  Since the 
late 1990s the government has introduced many new transfer programs. This includes transfers 
targeted at poor and rural regions, and the overall amount of “fiscal capacity” transfers has 
grown rapidly.  However, the system still puts far too little into ameliorating the large 
disparities in fiscal capacity across localities relative to the size of the disparities in per capita 
budgetary expenditure across localities. In addition, the efficiency of the system is limited due 
to the large number of earmarked transfers, whose design and implementation requirements as 
well as monitoring and evaluation needs are not matched by the existing capacity in the highly 
complex administrative system. 
  Although increased transfers have allowed more public spending, the increased 
dependency on – often earmarked – transfers has worsened budget efficiency, the ability to 
allocate budgets according to local needs, and possibly budget discipline at the local levels. 
The proliferation of transfers has increased the complexity and created inefficiencies of 
spending. Budget discipline has not improved. Evidence such as the emergence of new fees via 
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the creation of “project entities,” land sales, local-level indebtedness, and persistent 
overstaffing raise serious questions about the sustainability of the reforms and about the central 
government’s approach that relies heavily on an increase in (mostly earmarked) transfers to 
address issues in agriculture and rural development.  In the process, progress in some areas 
has only served to expose and highlight the need for further reforms and increased focus on the 
delivery of public services for the NSC.  
  The autonomy of the grassroots levels is extremely limited.  Rather than strengthening the 
township and village levels to enhance their capacity to provide public goods and services to 
citizens, reforms have greatly weakened their positions as revenue sources and authorities are, 
de facto and de jure, transferred to the county. This stands in contrast to the national policy of 
strengthening village institutions such as yishi yiyi and other democratic measures.  However, 
these participatory institutions not only require political support, but – in order to be 
meaningful – also authority over financial resources. 
  The lessons we draw from the analysis in this report can be summarized as follows: 
  First, the complex administrative and organizational structures impede resource flows and 
policy change. As the central government introduces new policies and increase resources 
devoted to rural areas, these changes have to be mediated by each successive level of 
government as well as all agencies before they reach the intended recipients. With so many 
layers and compartments, the process will hardly be straightforward.  
  Second, given this complex administrative structure, monitoring and supervision are of the 
utmost importance in keeping the reforms on course to achieve program objectives.  This 
poses a tremendous challenge since the availability, reliability, and timeliness of information 
are at present weak.  For example, it is impossible to track what public resources are spent on 
rural development by each government level.  Since the statistical reporting system – on fiscal 
resources or the public services that they finance - does not delineate “rural” as a category, it is 
not possible to fully identify what government spends in rural areas or on rural citizens.  Since 
2005 the Ministry of Finance has introduced a new category called “sannong spending” in an 
effort to track what resources are devoted to the rural sector, but MOF officials emphasize that 
it is very much a work in progress. 
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  Third, it is increasingly clear that the inefficiencies of many local governments are a 
formidable obstacle to improving rural public finance. Many of these inefficiencies cannot be 
addressed solely through increased funding, but instead require reforms in administrative 
structures, personnel management, and incentive systems for the governments more broadly. 
In fact, the low quality of services observed during the field visits to Henan and Yunnan can in 
part be attributed to allocative decisions by local governments that were unfavorable to rural 
citizens.  For example, the rural schools that had no money for heating or electric lighting had 
so many teachers that on average each teacher taught only twelve hours per week.  In the same 
vein, agricultural extension services, police stations, and even emergency medical services 
were often spending nearly all of their budgetary appropriations on staff expenditures, leaving 
little or no funding for the vehicles or fuel needed to take them to the field.  These allocative 
decisions can be traced to the distorted incentives created by the current system of budgeting, 
which uses staff numbers as the basis for calculating expenditure needs for local governments 
(and hence for the determination of transfers).  The incentive to expand staff size in poorer 
regions is reinforced by the system of a nationally unified civil service wage-setting, which 
makes remuneration for public employment extremely attractive compared to local incomes. 
  Given this context, the government faces a substantial challenge to implement its current 
program to build a New Socialist Countryside and a Harmonious Society that brings benefits to 
all.  Since the start of this decade the Government of China has put a strong emphasis on 
addressing the problems related to agriculture, farmers, and rural society, with the development 
of a “new socialist countryside” designated as a top priority for the Eleventh Five Year Plan 
(2006-2010).  The financing of public services in rural areas will be a key determinant of 
success.   
This report analyzes the performance of the intergovernmental fiscal system – the 
financing of rural development through counties, townships and villages; and the impact of 
recent reforms.  We show that achieving the government’s objectives will require substantial 
new resources be channelled to rural areas.  In addition, ensuring the effective transfer of 
resources and their efficient utilization will require fundamental reforms to a wide range of 
public institutions including budget and planning processes, personnel management systems, 
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and the organization of government agencies. 
We believe a comprehensive reform strategy is needed.  Such a strategy should address 
the fundamental vertical and horizontal imbalances in the intergovernmental fiscal system by 
introducing clear and appropriate expenditure assignments, increasing own revenues for local 
governments, and improving transfers.  The comprehensive reforms must also reach beyond 
the fiscal system to build improved accountability mechanisms with strengthened 
coordination, monitoring, and enforcement powers, including enlisting the help of 
communities, villages and rural citizens to improve public service delivery at the grassroots 
levels.  Finally, given China’s huge size and diversity, reform efforts must also focus on 
improving incentive structures at the county, township, and village levels to ensure 
implementation of national policies.
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